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This thesis analyzes the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) robust modernization campaign 
and explores why the IAF is on the path to transforming itself from an air force dedicated 
to air defense to one capable of global force projection.   The stunning examples of 
airpower in the two Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and Afghanistan proved to the Indian leadership 
the value of modern airpower.  Thanks to the amazing growth of the Indian economy, the 
IAF is acquiring the weapon systems characteristic of a global aerospace force.  Pakistan 
and China are concerned about the motivations behind IAF’s modernization efforts and 
already have begun to improve their own air capabilities in response to any conventional 
or nuclear contingency.  The responses of Pakistan, in particular, indicate the lowering of 
the nuclear threshold in South Asia.  On the other front, a potential arms race between 
India and China is anticipated.    
The United States may be able to neutralize the damaging effects of India’s 
military build-up by increasing its arms exports to both India and Pakistan.  Specifically, 
the sale of American F-16s to both countries would fortify bilateral relation with the 
United States, maintain the fragile security balance in South Asia, and minimize China’s 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INDIA’S INCREDIBLE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM: A THREAT TO 
STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA 
With a massive population and thriving economy, India is destined to become a 
world power.  The United States recognizes the strategic significance of India and is 
seeking measures to improve its bilateral relationship with this emerging Asian power.1  In 
order to become more respected and influential in the international arena, India has taken 
matters in its own hands by strengthening its military; specifically, India has begun one of 
the most robust Air Force modernization campaigns in modern history.2  The Indian 
civilian and military leadership observed the debilitating impact of airpower in subduing 
the enemy without committing heavy ground forces during the two Gulf Wars, Kosovo, 
and Afghanistan.3  As a result of these testaments to modern airpower superiority, the 
former Chief of the Indian Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy made the 
decision to “make the Air Force lean and lethal,” emphasizing technology to improve 
combat effectiveness and defeat potential enemies in modern warfare.4 Perhaps the 
greatest threat to peace on the subcontinent is not nuclear weapons, but India’s massive 
military modernization program.  The modernization of the Indian Air Force (IAF) 
enhances India’s war fighting capabilities and increases its international prestige as an 
emerging global military power but severely threaten Pakistan’s security and China’s 
status as the strongest airpower in Asia. 
The modernization of the IAF enhances India’s war-fighting capabilities but 
threatens Pakistan, which will improve its nuclear weapons program and China, which 
                                                
1 On 10 February 2005, U.S. House Representative, Frank Pallone, founder of the Congressional 
Caucus on India, introduced a ‘Sense of Congress’ legislation, representing the U.S. House of 
Representative’s first official support of  India’s bid to earn a seat on the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), so that it can be respected as an equal power to countries such as the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Russia, and China.  “Turning the Tide:  India Inches Closer to UNSC Seat,” The Economic Times, 
10 February 2005, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1017425.cms.  
2 India’s modernization programs for the Indian Air Force (IAF) over the last ten years have made the 
IAF the fourth largest air force in the world.  From “Air Force, India,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 
01 Feb 2005, www.janes.com.  Last accessed January 2005. 
3 Lt. General RK Jasbir Singh, ed., Indian Defence Yearbook 2004 (Dehra Dun, India: Natraj 
Publishers, 2004), 330. 
4 Ibid. 
2 
will modernize its antiquated air force to compete with India for regional power.  
Conversely, the reaction of both Pakistan and China depend heavily on the pace of the 
IAF’s modernization.  Despite the vast weapon acquisitions made by the IAF in recent 
years, the success of the IAF’s modernization depends on the proper integration of these 
new weapon systems and the ability of the IAF to adapt new tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.  The IAF is in a state of transformation and is unable to simultaneously defend 
itself in a conventional air war against Pakistan and China.   
Today, the IAF is capable of defending its territory and gaining air superiority 
versus Pakistan in a conventional war. The IAF will not risk an all out air war versus its 
neighbor because it is unable to detect and intercept Pakistan’s highly mobile nuclear 
ballistic missiles.  For the next ten years, one can expect relative stability between India 
and Pakistan.5  However, in the next ten to fifteen years, the IAF’s advanced combat 
fighters, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and aerial 
refueling capabilities may embolden India to conduct pre-emptive attacks versus strategic 
Pakistani targets thereby lowering the nuclear threshold in the subcontinent.6  
The moderate pace of modernization in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) is geared more towards its ability to seize Taiwan than to defeat India in any 
future conflicts.7  While the PLAAF is modernizing its forces at a slower pace than and 
the IAF, it will threaten India’s ability to become the major regional military power in 
Asia over the next twenty years.  The potential for any border conflicts similar to the 1962 
                                                
5 For the purposes of this thesis, stability in South Asia is defined more in line with crisis stability 
theory.  According to Robert Powell’s article “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1, March 1989, the logic of crisis stability implies that an international system 
in which offense is dominant is less stable than one in which defense is dominant, 62.  In the case of South 
Asia, India’s massive modernization program is creating a hostile offensive capability that threatens stability 
by contradicting the traditional defensive doctrines of both countries. 
6 George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), 
63.  Tanham makes a convincing argument that it is not a great leap from an Indian offensive defense or 
preemption to thinking offensively since some modern weapons encourage offensive thinking.  Irrespective 
of the strategic intentions of India’s current leadership, India is developing a capacity to execute offensive 
military operations.  
7 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), 307.  Shambaugh argues that the majority of the PLA’s modernization 
efforts are taking place to prepare China for potential tensions and conflicts with Taiwan.  Shambaugh cites 
the 6 March 2000 statement by Jiefangjun Bao, the PLA’s daily newspaper that read, “Taiwan independence 
means war and separation will lead to no peace…the People’s Liberation Army’s million of troops stand in 
combat readiness, are on high alert, and will never allow and sit idly by for any attempt to split China to 
succeed,” to support his argument. 
3 
Sino-Indian War remain remote for the next twenty years but the development of both air 
forces threatens to further destabilize the already fragile security dynamic in Asia for the 
foreseeable future. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The incredible pace of IAF modernization threatens the stability of South Asia 
over the long-term since its newfound technological capabilities may result in an offensive-
oriented doctrine that may lower the nuclear threshold a propos Pakistan while sparking a 
potential arms race with China.  Therefore, this thesis captures the major modernization 
upgrades taking place in the Indian Air Force (IAF) and will allow American policymakers 
and defense planners to better understand how these capabilities may destabilize the 
region.  The reaction of Pakistani and Chinese air forces toward the IAF’s modernization 
efforts will reveal the concern both countries share in respect to India’s growing 
conventional and unconventional capabilities.   The causes and effects inherent with the 
modernization of the IAF need to be explored and identified since the IAF is the second 
largest air force in Asia (China currently possesses the region’s largest air force), and could 
alter the balance of power in the region by challenging China’s regional hegemonic status.8  
If American policymakers and defense planners can fully grasp the true vision of the IAF, 
the United States may be able to encourage a cooperative, regional security arrangement 
that could potentially diffuse the tense security situation with Pakistan while avoiding an 
arms race with China.  Furthermore, if the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) can 
formulate a coherent military strategy with India, the United States may be able to free up 
military resources in the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).  By 
engaging India as an equal strategic partner, the United States may be able to rely upon 
India as a counterbalance to China’s military strength in the region, freeing up valuable air, 
land, and sea assets dedicated to monitoring the China-Taiwan situation towards fighting 
the War on Terrorism.   
While it is important to improve military ties with India, it is also important for 
U.S. policymakers and defense planners to comprehend why the IAF’s modernization 
challenges the United States’ long-held claim as the world’s most potent and lethal air 
                                                
8 Marcy Agmon and George K. Tanham, The Indian Air Force:  Trends and Prospects (Santa Monica, 
California:  RAND, 1995), p. x. 
4 
force.  In terms of U.S. defense spending, this thesis highlights the importance of pursuing 
advanced weaponry for future conflicts. Specifically, the rapid, technological development 
of the IAF explained here are designed for the U.S. Congress to take note of a militarily 
strong India and re-evaluate its proposed funding cuts for the United States Air Force’s 
most advanced combat fighter of the future, the F/A-22 Raptor. 9   The United States has 
always been at the forefront of aviation innovation, but continued to cuts to the Air Force’s 
next generation fighter may have catastrophic repercussions for America’s national 
security in any large-scale conventional or nuclear war that may present itself. 
C. INDIA’S THREAT PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN AND CHINA 
In order to better understand the modernization efforts of the IAF, it is first 
necessary to explore India’s threat perception of both Pakistan and China.  India continues 
to modernize its air force so it can defeat Pakistan in any future limited wars (such as 
Kargil) while maintaining a credible minimum deterrent with the capability and intent to 
deliver nuclear weapons from the air.  By modernizing its air force and tailoring it to 
conduct rapid operations, hitting targets with precision and lethality over a wide or 
restricted area, India believes that is more capable of deterring and coercing its immediate 
enemy, Pakistan.10 
India’s threat perception with China is somewhat different.  Due to its large size, 
population, conventional military strength, and nuclear capabilities, India perceives China 
as its major external military threat, though it has not proved to be as actively hostile to 
India as has Pakistan.11  In order to match China’s quantitative military capabilities, India 
continues to make significant strides in the modernization of its own air force to close the 
gap  on  the  regionally  ambitious China.  Thus, India’s primary motivation in modernizing  
                                                 
9 Laura M. Caolarusso examines the future of the U.S. Air Force in her article entitled, “The Fight to 
Stay on Top,” Air Force Times, 07 February 2005.  She argues that the U.S. Air Force is in jeopardy of 
losing its status of air dominance and questions how prepared it is to fight the next war.  For example, just as 
the F/A-22 Raptor nears full-rate production, the Pentagon is now considering cuts that would reduce the Air 
Force’s next generation fleet to 180 planes yet senior ranking service officials still insist that they need at 
least 381 Raptors to maintain air dominance. 
10 Air Marshal Vinod Patney (Retd), “Modernizing the Armed Forces and Defence Budget,” Peace and 
Conflict, Vol. 7, No. 9, September 2004, 3. 
11 Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, 35-36.  
5 
its  air  force  is  to  eventually deter  a  strategic  Chinese  nuclear  attack  while acquiring 
advanced aircraft to match China’s modern conventional capabilities. 
India possesses different threat perceptions of Pakistan and China based on 
historical experiences and future expectations.  It is vital for U.S. policy makers to 
understand these respective perceptions and accurately predict how India’s modernization 
and U.S. engagement turn these perceptions into realties.  For instance, if the United 
States supports India as a counter weight to China, bolstering India’s already robust 
military modernization, this directly threatens the fragile strategic balance in South Asia.12  
Balancing South Asian security is challenging and more immediate than a perceived 
future rivalry between India and China.13  The transfer of advanced technologies to India 
based on the perceived Sino-Indian rivalry may end the “ugly stability” in South Asia as 
Pakistan is forced to develop dangerous “counter veiling” strategies (for example, 
increasing Pakistan’s arsenal of Short Range Ballistic Missiles, SRBMs) versus India.14  
The following sections provide more detail into the historical and current Indian threat 
perceptions of Pakistan and China, analyzing the influence of such perceptions on South 
Asian security. 
1. India’s Threat Perception of Pakistan 
India remains suspicious of a Pakistani state with a long period of authoritarian 
military rule that has arrested the development of democratic institutions in this country 
since its partition with India in 1947.15  The most contentious issue between both countries 
is the status of Jammu and Kashmir.  Pakistan was created as the homeland for the 
Muslims of the subcontinent; therefore, Pakistan remains committed to incorporating the 
Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir into its domain (reference Kashmir map 
below).16  As the largest democracy in the world, India is committed to the vision of civic 
nationalism and will do everything in its power to thwart Pakistan’s goal of obtaining 
                                                
12 Feroz Khan (Brigadier General (Ret.), Pakistan Army), discussion with author, 24 March 2005. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending:  India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York:  Colombia 
University Press, 2001), 7. 
16 Ibid, 5. 
6 
Jammu and Kashmir so that it can demonstrate that all communities, regardless of 
religious orientation, can thrive under India’s secular dispensation.17  Thus, India is 
committed to maintaining control of Jammu and Kashmir because if India were to lose 
Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan this may embolden other Indian states to break away 
from Delhi.  Since Pakistan threatens the legitimacy of a democratic and secular Indian 
state, India perceives Pakistan as its greatest immediate security threat. 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Jammu and Kashmir18 
 
 
                                                
17 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending:  India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, 7. 
18 “Kashmir Region” graph retrieved from the CIA’s website, www.cia.gov.  Last accessed January 
2005.  Note Line of Control separating Pakistan-controlled Kashmir from Indian-controlled Kashmir 
7 
In terms of military doctrine toward Pakistan, “offensive defense” summed up the 
approach India adopted in past wars (in 1947-48 and again in 1965); strong defensive lines 
were formed in areas of importance, with adequate forces to break up an enemy force that 
might manage to penetrate these defenses.19  Furthermore, the IAF argued that its first goal 
should always be to win the air war before fully supporting the ground war.20   Since 
Pakistan has historically infiltrated insurgents into the contested region of Kashmir, India is 
determined to maintain a conventional edge to Pakistan’s armed forces, capable of 
defeating Pakistan forces not only in Kashmir, but also in Pakistan territory, if necessary.  
While Kashmir did not play a major role in the 1971 war fought over the separation of East 
Bengal from Pakistan, Kashmir has been the major source for conflict between India and 
Pakistan since 1989.21   
India’s expectation of stability in South Asia, which was assumed to follow after 
Pakistani nuclear weapons neutralized Indian conventional superiority, has not been 
fulfilled; instead, Pakistan has been encouraged to take greater risks in Jammu and 
Kashmir that necessitated a strong Indian military response in the 1999 Kargil conflict.22  If 
anything, India’s perception of Pakistan as a major security concern increased with the 
introduction of nuclear weapons in 1998.  Recently, Pakistan has been forced to deal with 
rising Islamic extremism, nuclear weapons proliferation, and a weak economy, only 
heightening Indian fears of a “failed” Pakistani state that may accelerate the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to hostile states (or non-state actors), and serve as a base for radical 
Islamic movements that target Indian Muslims.23  In respect to Pakistan, India believes that 
it needs to continue to modernize its air force so it can clearly defeat Pakistan in any future 
limited wars (such as Kargil) while maintaining a credible minimum deterrent with the 
capability and intent to deliver nuclear weapons from the air.   
 
                                                
19 V.R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, 
Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001): 8.   
20 Ibid.   
21 Stephen Philip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001), 217. 
22 Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” 16. 
23 Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 227. 
8 
2. India’s Threat Perception of China 
Due to its large size, population, conventional military strength, and nuclear 
capabilities, India perceives China as its major external military threat, though it has not 
proved to be as actively hostile to India as has Pakistan.24  India is extremely concerned 
with China’s geo-political objectives in Asia.25  Specifically, India understands the 
importance of energy since it is the key to continued and sustained economic growth for 
both countries.26  China’s monumental demand for the world’s valuable energy resources 
threatens India’s long-term economic development.  Therefore, it is in Indian’s vital 
national interests to protect the oil that travels from the Persian Gulf to India and onwards 
to the Straits of Malacca.  Another precarious concern for India is China’s long-standing 
support for India’s main enemy, Pakistan.27  Beijing’s military and economic support for 
Pakistan is a major source of friction in Sino-Indian relations; Chinese support for 
Pakistan’s Kashmir position has only added to the discomfort of India’s leaders.28  
Historical high level talks between Indian and Chinese diplomats have mostly been 
symbolic, having no affect on India’s threat perception of its neighbor to the North. 
India’s perception of China will not improve until the following issues are properly 
addressed:  border issues, Chinese ties with Pakistan (as well as Burma and Bangladesh), 
India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama, and trade.29  Without a quick resolution of these major 
issues, and some transparency in each other’s military and nuclear weapons programs, it 
will be difficult for India to trust China as it did prior to the 1962 Sino-Indian War.  Since 
this war, China remains India’s long-term security concern, especially in the realm of 
                                                
24 Tanham and Agmon, The Indian Air Force:  Trends and Prospects, 35-36.  
25 In Keith Bradsher’s article, “India Joints China in Stepped-Up Thirst for Oil,” International Herald 
Tribune Online, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/17/news/energy.html.  Last accessed February 2005.  
Bradsher references India’s minister of oil and natural gas who argues that India and other Asian nations 
need to pursue their own interests in oil markets amidst China’s ravenous thirst for oil.  
26 Bradsher, “India Joints China in Stepped-Up Thirst for Oil.” 
27 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Maryland:  
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 134. 
28 Kronstad, K. Alan, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “India–U.S. Relations,” 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 3 December 2003, CRS 4. 
29 Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States, 135-136. 
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defense spending.30  Nehru even realized the long-term security threat of China after the 
1962 war as his 1964 five year military modernization plan included the stabilization of the 
IAF at forty-five squadrons, re-equipping it with modern aircraft.31  In order to meet 
China’s quantitative military capabilities, India continues to make significant strides in the 
modernization of its own air force to close the gap on the strategically ambitious China.  
While India is still unable to compete with China on a nuclear level (since India cannot 
target Beijing) it is improving its strategic reach from the air by acquiring air-to-air 
refuelers.  Since China’s nuclear Mid-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and Intermediate-
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) far outnumber India’s, India’s best resort in any potential 
nuclear conflict is with the aerial delivery of nuclear weapons.  Thus, India’s primary 
motivation in modernizing its air force is to eventually deter China from attacking India 
with a strategic nuclear strike option from the skies while acquiring advanced aircraft to 
match China’s modern conventional air capabilities. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In addition to India’s threat perception of its neighbors, this chapter also assesses 
the current U.S.-India security relationship in respect to India’s massive military 
modernization program.   Chapter II (Modernization of the IAF) of this thesis explores the 
“how” and “why” of the IAF’s modernization program.  Chapter III (Pakistani Reaction:  
Reviving the Pakistani Air Force, PAF) inspects the history of the PAF and the PAF’s 
reaction to IAF modernization, while Chapter IV (Chinese Reaction: Modernizing the 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force, PLAAF) examines China’s unique threat perception 
of India, its nuclear capabilities, and finally, the PLAAF’s reaction to IAF modernization.  
By assessing the reactions of India’s two chief rivals, Pakistan and China, I explain how 
the IAF’s aggressive modernization program will escalate tensions throughout the region 
as all three countries strive to upgrade their air forces in order to better defend themselves.  
However, if America can manage the security dilemma in South Asia through conflict 
mediation and resolution, treating both India and Pakistan as equals throughout the peace 
process, then the negative effects of the IAF’s rapid modernization  (the lowering of the 
                                                
30 Peter R. Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb? India and Nuclear Weapons, 1947-1974  (New 
York: Palgrave-MacMillan, forthcoming), 190. 
31 Ibid, 197 
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nuclear threshold in South Asia and a potential arms race with China) may be avoided.  A 
brief description of each chapter is provided below. 
1. Modernization of the IAF (Chapter II) 
The IAF is modernizing because modern warfare requires a technologically 
advanced air force, because India wants to be able to deter and defeat Pakistan in any 
potential conflict and because India wants to deter and match China in any future 
confrontations.  The IAF began its program of modernization in the mid-1990s.  Since 
then, the IAF has made significant progress in acquiring and developing sophisticated 
aircraft weapon systems to obtain complete conventional and possibly nuclear superiority 
with the PAF while closing the gap on conventional capabilities with the PLAAF.  The 
specific goals desired by the Indian civilian leadership are identified by the IAF’s latest 
acquisitions:  the Sukhoi Su-30MKI advanced combat fighter, the Phalcon airborne early 
warning system, and the IL-78 air-to-air refueler.  While particular attention is paid to these 
three major weapon systems, other upgrades to the IAF are explored, such as the PINE 
radar system, upgrades to the Mig-21 Bison and the possible acquisition of the Mirage 
2000-5.  
2. Pakistani Reaction: Reviving the PAF (Chapter III) 
In Chapter III I explore the response of the PAF to IAF modernization.  It is more 
than likely that Pakistan will strengthen its military cooperation ties with China to 
modernize its air force. The reason for this is quite simple: the gap between the PAF and 
IAF today is remarkable.  As of the year 2000, the India: Pakistan fixed wing combat 
aircraft ratio was 2.67:1.32  Pakistan remains economically and politically constrained, and 
will be unable to upgrade its air force’s conventional capabilities in the immediate future.  
Instead, Pakistan gradually will improve its air force by exploring the asymmetric 
advantages of its aerial nuclear delivery capabilities and increasing defense ties with 
China.   
 
                                                
32 Rodney W. Jones, “Strategic Stability and Conventional Force Imbalance: Case of South Asia,” 
Policy Architects International, 
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sassu/publications/StrStab&ConvAsymmetry_Bradford_2.pdf, 6.  Last 
accessed January 2005.   
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3. Chinese Reaction: Modernizing the PLAAF (Chapter IV) 
In Chapter IV I measure the Chinese reaction to IAF modernization by analyzing 
China’s threat perception of India, China’s nuclear program, and the current 
modernization efforts of the PLAAF.  The main goal of this chapter is to determine 
whether or not China perceives IAF modernization as a significant threat.  My assessment 
is that China is relatively indifferent to IAF modernization since China perceives the 
United States, not India, as its primary opponent in the region.  Furthermore, China is 
more concerned with reclaiming Taiwan so the structure of its air force is more 
concentrated on its coastal region than with its southern border along the Himalayas.  
Regardless, China will continue to provide Pakistan with arms to help it counter Indian 
conventional military superiority. 
4. Conclusion (Chapter V)   
In the conclusion of my thesis my evidence supports my major argument that the 
modernization of the IAF is the greatest threat to stability in South Asia over the long 
term.  The major policy recommendation from this chapter is to advise American 
policymakers and defense planners to “proceed with caution” in South Asia and be 
extremely careful in militarily supporting India so as not to upset the precarious security 
balance in South Asia.  Military ties will continue to strengthen between both Pakistan and 
China as both countries seek to minimize the influence of both India and the United States 
in South Asia.  
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 In addition to the United States’ security relationship with India, one must also 
take into consideration India’s emergence as a global air force.  With the successes in the 
Joint Indo-American and multi-national air exercises, Cope India and Cope Thunder, the 
IAF now perceives itself as a world-class air force33  Also, the IAF conducted bilateral air 
                                                
33 According to the Indian Air Force’s official homepage at http://indianairforce.nic.in/Cope.htm the 
exercise Cope India was a success from day one as the U.S. Air Force were very impressed by the IAF’s 
flying capabilities and professionalism.  According to the team leader of the U.S. Air Force contingent, Col. 
Greg Newbech, “What we’ve seen in the last two weeks is that the IAF can stand toe-to-toe with the best Air 
Force in the world.”  Last accessed January 2005. 
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exercises with the South African and Singaporean air forces.34  India is content to increase 
training with other air forces since this supports its foreign policy of multi-lateralism.  
This will limit the United States’ influence on the development of the IAF as the history of 
Indo-American relations has led the Indian government to view the United States as an 
inconsistent geo-political partner.  Since the IAF can only conduct a limited number of 
exercises a year, this may hurt the emerging defense relationship between the United 
States and India as India looks to keep its options open and train with other competitive air 
forces.  For example, due to a strong relationship in respect to arms sales, there is a strong 
possibility that India may conduct air exercises with Israel in the immediate future. 
With the modernization of the IAF via the specific acquisitions aforementioned, 
India has noticeably achieved a conventional edge over Pakistan, its immediate rival, 
while qualitatively catching up with the PLAAF.  After observing the success of the 
USAF in the Persian Gulf War (and noting the importance of air superiority in any land 
war), the IAF decided to pursue the Su-30MKI, Phalcon AWACS, and Il-78 air-to-air 
refuelers as the force multipliers necessary to defeat the PAF and match the PLAAF in any 
future conventional or limited wars.  While all three of these weapon systems could act in 
unison to conduct the successful air delivery of a nuclear weapon into Pakistan, the IAF 
will first concentrate on utilizing these platforms in a conventional role (which may still 
take another ten years for the IAF to operate and integrate successfully).  The only 
exception to the use of these weapons systems in a conventional role may be the IAF’s 
utilization of the Su-30MKI to deliver a nuclear weapon into Pakistan as a secondary 
strategic strike option.  Due to China’s vast strategic nuclear force advantage over India, it 
is clear that India’s primary motivation for acquiring these systems is to match the PLAAF 
in any conflict scenario in the Himalayas.  Ironically, the training provided by the USAF  
                                                
34 Exercise Golden Eagle was a joint Indian and South African air exercise held in South Africa.  
Information retrieved from Government of India’s High Commission website, 
http://indiahighcom.intnet.mu/prl_7.htm.  Last accessed January 2005.  The inaugural bilateral exercise, 
named SINDEX 04, between the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and the IAF was held at Gwalior 
Air Force Station in Western India from 11 to 27 October 2004.  From the 16 October 2004 article entitled, 
“Singapore and India Hold Inaugural Bilateral Air Exercise,” from the RSAF’s official website 
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/rsaf/alert/ne-na-tpl.asp?newsid=121.  Last accessed January 2005. 
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to the IAF may further destabilize South Asia since Pakistan will perceive India’s 
advanced weapon systems and training as a threat to its own security, forcing Pakistan to 
lower its nuclear threshold.   
Alternatively, China may perceive the IAF’s upgrades and exercises with the 
USAF as a threat to China’s prestige and influence, sparking possible arms race between 
these two Asian rivals.  In addition, the IAF’s modernization, with its sophisticated 
weapon acquisitions and exercises with the USAF, may provoke China and Pakistan to 
reinforce their security ties as a counter-balance to a perceived Indo-American security 
alliance.  As the IAF continues to modernize and improve its operational capabilities, the 
United States should not only recognize the government of India’s multi-lateral approach 
to international relations but the potentially damaging side effects of any future joint-
training exercises. Even if tensions do increase, the United States has the capability to 
influence the security dilemma in South Asia.  Therefore, it is unlikely that we will see a 
major conflict in the South Asia in the immediate future as the United States will make 
every effort to ensure that Pakistan does not become too weak in respect to India while a 
the same time, the United States will promote a new defense relationship with India to 
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II. INDIAN AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Indian Air Force’s modernization program began in the 1980s but experienced 
serious problems later that decade as the country faced a growing foreign exchange 
crisis.35  Due to this economic crisis, India implemented economic liberalization reforms 
in the early 1990s, which in return, revitalized the economy and bolstered the defense 
budget.  Thanks to this increase in defense spending, the IAF has made considerable 
progress in acquiring and developing sophisticated aircraft weapon systems to obtain 
complete conventional superiority with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), while closing the 
gap on conventional capabilities with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).  
The scale of the IAF’s modernization efforts is monumental since it is targeted at 
improving all facets of the IAF including Close Air Support (CAS), ISR, precision strike, 
mid-air refueling and tactical/strategic airlift.  
In the past, the IAF failed to modernize because weaponry was imported from 
several countries and produced from an array of suppliers.36  This avoided allowing a 
single external power the possibility of influencing India’s foreign and defense policy 
through the withholding of spare parts and technical assistance.37  Further complicating 
the IAF’s modernization is an extremely ineffective defense procurement process, tied 
down by India’s complex bureaucracy of competing interests.  Despite its policy of non-
alignment throughout the Cold War, India relied upon the Soviet Union for the majority of 
its defense equipment.38  Over the last ten years, India has begun to look at other vendors 
and has reinvigorated its indigenous production capabilities to lessen its reliance on Russia 
and improve its lackluster defense industry.  Notwithstanding the poor decisions of past 
Indian leaders, India has become the world’s fourth largest air force and is considered to 
                                                
35 Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal:  Direction or Drift in Defense Policy (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 132-133. 
36 Ibid, 223. 
37 Chris Smith argues: “India’s defense posture is as unstructured and anarchic as it is profligate,” 
India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal, 223. 
38 According to George K. Tanham and Marcy Agman, The Indian Air Force:  Trends and Prospects 
(Santa Monica:  RAND, 1995), 81-84, about 60 percent of India’s current combat aircraft inventory is of 
Soviet origin while 80 percent of India’s transports and helicopters are of Soviet design. 
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be a modern and technology driven service.39   Perhaps one of the greatest incentives for 
modernizing the IAF was the awesome exhibition of air power by the United States in the 
Persian Gulf War and Kosovo.  In response to the clearly demonstrated debilitating impact 
of airpower in modern warfare, the former Chief of the Indian Air Staff, Air Chief 
Marshal S. Krishnaswamy expressed his intention of developing a “lean and lethal” air 
force base on advanced technologies.40  On the operational and tactical levels, the goal of 
the IAF’s recent modernization efforts are to maximize effectiveness by ensuring its 
aircraft can control the skies, conduct independent strikes, reconnaissance, airlift and 
combat air support operations.41  On the strategic level, the IAF is acquiring high-
technology (specifically, the Sukhoi Su-30MKI advanced combat fighter, the Phalcon 
airborne early warning system, and the IL-78 air-to-air refueler) to defend itself against its 
two greatest threats, Pakistan and China.   
The IAF is modernizing because modern warfare requires a technologically 
advanced air force, because India wants to be able to deter and defeat Pakistan in any 
potential conflict, and because India wants to deter and match China in any future 
confrontations.  The rest of this chapter is dedicated to analyzing the current 
modernization efforts taking place in the IAF.  After a broad overview of the IAF’s 
modernization efforts, I focus on the IAF’s acquisition of three hi-tech platforms 
mentioned above assessing their utility in a conventional and/or nuclear capacity versus 
Pakistan and China.  The overall objective of this chapter is to demonstrate why the IAF’s 
latest modernization efforts threaten stability in South Asia and may spur a costly arms 
race between India and China. 
B. THE IAF’S ROBUST MODERIZATION CAMPAIGN 
India is acquiring foreign weapons systems to conventionally and 
unconventionally deter aggressive actions from either Pakistan and/or China while 
retaining an offensive strike capability (for instance, in a punitive air strike role versus 
Pakistan during a Kargil-type scenario).   This  section  briefly explains some of the major  
                                                
39 “Indian Air Force,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. www.janes.com.  Last accessed January 
2005 
40 Jasbir Singh, ed.  The Indian Defense Yearbook 2004 (New Delhi:  Natraj Publishers, 2004), 330. 
41 Singh, The Indian Defense Yearbook 2004, 332. 
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modernization programs taking place within the IAF including jet trainer and combat 
fighter upgrades, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), air defense upgrades, and transport 
aircraft upgrades. 
1. Jet Trainer and Combat Fighter Upgrades 
Of utmost importance to any major air force is its ability to generate top-notch 
pilots.  The IAF understands the value of training in the best aircraft available and has 
actively pursued a jet trainer to replace its aging fleet of MiG 21 trainer aircraft.  While 
the MiG-21 fighter is the mainstay of the IAF, about 70 to 80 will be phased out by 2012 
and substituted with the British Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer.42  It is assessed that 22 
Hawk jets will be delivered by BAE Systems while 44 more will be manufactured under 
license by Indian-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).43  The training of IAF 
pilots in the British Hawk AJT have already begun as 20 IAF pilots are in currently in the 
United Kingdom receiving training from BAE Systems.44  India should begin receiving 
the first of its Hawk AJTs prior to the Aero India air show in February 2007 providing the 
IAF with a long-term improvement to its jet fighter training as pilots will be able to accrue 
more flight hours and train in a safer aircraft than the accident-prone Mig-21.45 
While the IAF may have fixed its necessity for a credible jet trainer, it continues to 
upgrade its various multi-role combat fighters.  The IAF has begun to phase out its MiG-
23 and MiG-25 aircraft, transferring their roles to the Jaguar and MiG-29.46  Due to the 
massive number of MiG-21s in the IAF inventory, the IAF committed itself to the MiG-21 
BIS  modernization  program  that  will  eventually  upgrade  123 Mig-21s into the Mig-21  
                                                
42 As stated by the former head of the IAF, Air Chief Marshall S. Krishnaswamy on 13 Jun 2004 in an 
interview with the Indo-Asia News Service. “India Air Force to Phase out MiG-21 Trainer Aircraft,” Xinhua 
News Service Agency, 14 June 2004, 1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Eventually, 70 pilots will be trained on the British Hawk AJT.  “Britain to Deliver First Hawk to 
India by Aero India 2007,” Deccan Herald, http://deccanherald.com/deccanherald/feb082005/i18.asp.  Last 
accessed February 2005. 
45 “Britain to Deliver First Hawk to India by Aero India 2007.” 
46 The IAF currently has 18 MiG-23MF air-defense fighters, 54 MiG-23BN ground-attack aircraft, and 
16 MiG-23BN variants optimized for electronic warfare, as well as eight MiG-25s.  Pulkit Singh, “India 
Bolstering Jaguar Fleet, Phasing Out Some Older MiGs,” Journal of Electronic Defense, October 2002, Vol. 
25, Iss. 10, 26. 
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BIS.47  The MiG-21 BIS are under series upgrade with HAL (Nasik Division) and are 
being fitted with state-of-the-art avionics systems; 64 aircraft have been upgraded by HAL 
so far.48   
In addition to the MiG-21 BIS, the Jaguar (reference photo below), a deep-
penetration strike fighter, recently proved itself by conducting a transatlantic flight to 
Alaska to participate in the multi-lateral exercise Cope Thunder.49  HAL has also begun 
significant upgrades to the Jaguar by improving its navigation and weapon aiming 
performance.50  While the indigenously produced Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) continues 
to experience delays in its actual implementation into the operational IAF, it is still 
considered as a key element in the IAF’s upgraded fleet of combat fighters.  Due to the 
importance of real-time data communications, realized during the American air campaign 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Aeronautical Development Agency and the Defense 
Research Development Organization are developing real-time applications and exploring 
the possibility of outsourcing the IAF’s software requirement for the Jaguar and the 
LCA.51  In addition to the current combat aircraft in the IAF inventory, the current chief of 
the IAF, Air Chief Marshall S.P. Tyagi, is actively pursuing a number of aircraft from 
Lockheed Martin (United States), Dassault Aviation (France), MiG Corporation (Russia), 
and Grippen (Sweden) as a plan to acquire 125 fighters and phase out 300 MiG-21s by 
2007.52  Thus, the IAF is attempting to move away from its reliance on Russian aircraft 
and seeking to produce and upgrade its own jet aircraft either indigenously or with other 
nations. 
                                                
47 2002-2003 Annual Report, Ministry of Defense.  Government of India.  Indian Ministry of Defence’s 
official website: http://mod.nic.in/, 52.  Last accessed March 2005. 
48 2003-2004 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.  Indian Ministry of Defence’s 
offical website: http://mod.nic.in/, 51. Last accessed March 2005. 
49 “6 IAF Jaguars To Take Part in ‘Cope Thunder 2004,’” Rediff.com, 15 June 2004, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/15iaf.htm.  Last accessed January 2005. 
50 2003-2004 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 82. 
51 Fakir Chand, “IAF Draws Lessons from Gulf War,” Rediff.com, 27 June 2003, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/27iaf.htm. Last accessed January 2005. 
52 “IAF Sounds Fighter Makers,” Deccan Herald, 08 February 2005, 
http://deccanherald.com/deccanherald/feb082005/i3.asp. Last accessed February 2005. 
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UAVs are being increasingly viewed as force multipliers in any conflict since they 
send real time data and pictures inside enemy territory and can safely evade enemy 
radars.54  Due to the lack of ISR during the Kargil crisis, UAVs became one of the high 
priority requirements of the IAF.55  Thus, the IAF has made a concentrated effort to induct 
high-quality UAVs into its inventory to improve its ISR capabilities.  In support of this 
effort, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) completed a $240-million deal for the 
acquisition of 30 Heron UAVs from Israel’s Aircraft Industries along with ground 
stations, communications equipment, and intelligence-gathering payloads.56  This is in 
                                                
53 Photo accessed at http://homepage.mac.com/topcover/PhotoAlbum46.html.  Last accessed March 
2005.  In this photo, the IAF Jaguar is preparing for an aerial refueling, 
54 Farah Naaz, “Indo-Israel Military Cooperation,” Strategic Analysis:  A Monthly Journal of IDSA, 
August 2000, Vol. 24, No. 5. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The Heron UAV is a medium-altitude, high endurance UAF with a payload capacity of up to 52 
hours of continuous operations.  The Heron UAVs are being acquired to reach the higher reaches of the 
disputed Jammu and Kashmir, where Herons already in Indian service have been very successful, according 
to an Indian MoD official.  Pulkit Singh, “India Orders More UAVs From Israel,” Journal of Electronic 
Defense, January 2005, Vol. 28, No. 1, 21. 
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addition to the 120 UAVs India has already purchased from Israel including Searcher-1, 
Searcher-2, and Heron UAVs.57  India’s indigenously developed Nishant UAV has not yet 
been inducted into the Indian armed forces due to technical problems.58  Therefore, the 
IAF will continue to utilize UAVs as a means to fill intelligence gaps, especially in high-
altitude contested regions such as the Siachen glacier, until the induction of the Phalcon 
Airborne Early Warning System. 
3. Viable Air Defense System 
In order to cover its air defense gaps across its extensive landmass to adequately 
defend itself from a Pakistani and/or Chinese air and missile attacks, India is pursuing 
highly capable air defense systems.  Of interest to India is the Arrow Weapon System 
(AWS), an Israeli weapons system that can identify, intercept, and destroy missile 
launchers at great distances.59  The Green Pine radar is an essential part of the AWS (also 
known as ‘Homa’ in Israel, which means fence), developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries 
(IAI), and the one viable solution to air defense from ballistic missiles preferred by the 
IAF.60  The Homa system is designed to simultaneously intercept as many as 14 incoming 
Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs).61  The Green Pine radar is an electronically scanned, 
solid state, phased array radar that can detect targets up to ranges of about 500km and is 
able to track targets up to speeds of 3.000m/s; two Elta Green Pine radar systems were 
delivered to India as part of the nation’s air defense system against ballistic missiles in 
2001.62  Since the Arrow 2 project is a joint U.S.-Israeli initiative, the United States can 
deny the export of the Arrow missiles to India.  Due to the tensions between Pakistan and 
India it is unlikely that the United States will allow the export of the Arrow 2 missiles to 
India despite the United State’s support of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). 
                                                
57 Pulkit Singh, “India Orders More UAVs From Israel.” 
58 Ibid. 
59 Jay Bushinksy, “Radar System Sale to India Approved, “ The Washington Times, 02 March 2004, 
http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040301-100359-6990r.htm. Last accessed January 2005. 
60 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Which Way is India’s BMD/AEW System Headed?” 
http://www.indiadefence.com/BMD&AEW.htm. Last accessed March 2005. 
61 Other critical elements of the Homa System include the Citron Tree battle management center, 1.3 
ton Arrow-2 interceptor missile and a containerized ‘Hazelnut Tree’ launch control center (still not a part of 
the IAF’s inventory).  The future integration of an airborne early warning system or UAV would boost the 
intercept capabilities of Homa.  Ibid. 
62 “Arrow 2 Theater Ballistic Missile Defence System, Israel,” Army-Technology.com, 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/arrow2/. Last accessed March 2005. 
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In addition to the modernization programs mentioned above, the IAF has invested 
a substantial amount of its funding and resources into the following weapons systems:  the 
advanced Su-30MKI (Russian acronym for Multirole, Commercial, Indian) combat 
fighter, the Phalcon radar Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system, and the IL-78 air-to-air 
refueling tanker.  After describing these acquisitions individually, it is important to assess 
exactly why India is acquiring these foreign weapons systems.  Therefore, the capabilities 
of each weapon system will be analyzed to determine who India is most likely to employ 
these modern weapon systems against and whether or not they intend to apply these 
weapons in a conventional role, a nuclear role, or both. 
C. IAF SU-30 MKI – AIR SUPERIORITY IN SOUTH ASIA 
The IAF likes to call the Su-30MKI an Air Dominance Fighter (ADF).63  The IAF 
decided on the Su-30MKI program in 1996 (when it signed a US $1.8 billion contract with 
the Russian defense company, IRKUT) to fulfill the IAF’s requirement for a new multi-
role fighter with superlative air superiority and ground attack capabilities.64  Furthermore, 
the requirement for an advanced combat fighter to replace the antiquated Mig-21s became 
urgent as India’s indigenously produced Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) fell further and 
further behind in production.  Another factor that influenced India’s decision to acquire 
the Su-30MKI was when China placed an order for the Su-30MK designated the J-11 by 
Beijing.65  The IAF ordered the Indian specific MKI version since it had the capability to 
contact suppliers in France and Israel for the joint development of key weapons 
management, radar, and avionics that would give the MKI version an edge over the 
Chinese J-11.66  One of the final requirements for the Su-30MKI included the need to 
replace the aged and accident-prone Mig-21s in order to compete with and defeat both the 
Pakistani Air Force’s F-16 and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s J-11 in a limited 
or conventional war.   The I AF  had to replace the aging Mig-21 jets since they have been  
                                                






involved in at least 250 crashes and 100 pilot deaths since 1991.67  Finally, the Su-30 MKI 
should be capable of delivering nuclear weapons from the air well within the boundaries 
of both Pakistan and China.68 
 
 
Figure 3.   View of Su-30 MKIs69 
 
Currently, the IAF operates 18 Su-30K and 22 Su-30MKI fighters.70  In order to 
maintain a competitive advantage over its regional rivals, Pakistan and China, India will 
not only import Su-30MKIs from Russia but produce them as well.  Since HAL has the 
licensing rights for the indigenous production of the Su-30MKI (agreed upon in the 1996 
contract), by 2007-2008 all IAF Su-30MKIs will be exclusively produced in India.71  
Eventually India will produce a total of 140 Su-30MKI fighters between 2004 and 2017 
representing the largest contract signed between Russia and India through their military 
                                                
67 “India’s Air Force Scraps Outdated Jets,” BBC News Online, 09 November 2002, www.bbc.com. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Photos retrieved from the Indian Air Force, Bharatiya Vayu Sena website, http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/IAF/  Last accessed January 2005.  Su-30MKIs from No. 20 Lightening Squadron in flight 
over Pune and Yelahanka airfields, respectively. 
70 “Russia’s Irkut About to Complete Su-30MKI Deliveries to India, Start Production at HAL 
Enterprises,” English compilation of reports from the website of Moscow Voyennykh Novostey, 11 May 
2004.  Accessed from the Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) portal at 
https://portal.rccb.osis.gov/ on January 2005. 
71 Ibid. 
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technical cooperation agreement.72  In terms of combat capability, the Su-30MKI is fitted 
with the Bars radar, capable of detecting enemy fighters at a range of up to 130 km in the 
forward hemisphere, and over 60 km in the rear hemisphere.73  Also, the aircraft is 
capable of carrying almost the whole range of weapon systems with a total weight of up to 
eight tons; its range totals 3,000 km without refueling, 5,200 km with one refueling.  If 
India can successfully produce the Su-30MKI indigenously, maintain a respectable pilot 
training program, and maintenance support program, the IAF will be able to field an 
advanced multi-role fighter capable defeating Pakistan’s and China’s most sophisticated 
combat aircraft in conventional defensive/offensive, air/ground operations. 
1. Conventional Role for Su-30MKI 
With its mix of firepower, early warning, and maneuverability, the IAF Su-30MKI 
should be able to defeat any regional air threat in South Asia (reference Table 1, 
Performance/capability comparison of IAF Su-30 MKI to the Russian/Chinese Su-30MK 
(J-11) and American F-15E below).  In a potential limited and/or conventional war with 
either Pakistan and/or China, the IAF foresees the Su-30MKI as the key to gaining air 
superiority.  In the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars, the IAF had no restrictions on the 
use of offensive airpower; in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil Conflict the 
use of air power was hedged with various restrictions since the perception was that the full 
use of offensive air power is fundamentally escalatory.74  Regardless, the official IAF 
doctrine states that during wartime, “The fight for control of the air or air superiority gets 
first priority in every case.”75  In terms of any potential air conflict with Pakistan, the IAF 
already has a two-to-one overall advantage in aircraft that grows to almost a six-to-one 
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2004.  Accessed from FBIS on January 2005 at https://portal.rccb.osis.gov/. 
73 Ibid. 
74 R. Sukumaran, “The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999:  Restrictions on the Use of Air Power,” 
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75 Doctrine of the Air Force, Air Headquarters, New Delhi, October 1995, referenced in V.R. 
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advantage when one compares just the modern and most capable aircraft.76  The addition 
of the Su-30MKI tilts the conventional arms advantage even more in India’s favor.  
Furthermore, the Su-30MKI, with its advanced avionics, precision-guided munitions, and 
data links capable of uploading valuable targeting data, fits well into India’s new military 
strategy of limited war.  This limited war strategy calls for the IAF to conduct precise, 
punitive strikes on enemy targets within Pakistan with little collateral damage (a likely 
scenario if the Pakistani military were to support insurgents operating in Kashmir).  The 
overall strategy of the Indian military is to hit Pakistan quickly and aggressively.  The Su-
30MKI helps support this objective by potentially limiting the length of the conflict in 
order to avoid unnecessary international pressure to act otherwise.   
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Last accessed January 2005. 
25 
 
Table 1. Performance/capability comparison of IAF Su-30 MKI to the 
Russian/Chinese Su-30MK (J-11) and American F-15E77 
 
While the acquisition and development of the Su-30MKI adequately meets the 
IAF’s objectives in a limited war scenario with Pakistan, it is more difficult to ascertain 
the IAF’s conventional goals in comparison with China.  Obviously, the Su-30MKI 
increases the ability of the IAF to defeat the PLAAF’s combat aircraft and gain air 
superiority in any border conflict with China.  Unfortunately, the PLAAF, with over 3,000 
combat aircraft has an enormous quantitative advantage over India in a conventional 
sense.78  Conversely, China has been extremely slow in modernizing its air force due to 
                                                
77 Ahmedullah, “India Enters Fighter “Big League.” 
78 A.K. Sachdev, “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force,” Strategic Analysis:  A Monthly Journal of 
the IDSA, Vol. 23, No. 6, September 1999. 
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inadequacies in its military industrial complex and its failure to acquire to obtain high-
technology from Western powers due to sanctions imposed by the Europeans and 
Americans after the Tiananmen Square incident.79  With the Su-30MKI, the IAF has made 
a modest effort to catch up with the PLAAF in terms of quality.  In any case, The PLAAF 
realizes that the IAF is significantly modernizing its combat aircraft capability and is 
acquiring highly capable Su-27 and Su-30MKs (not to defeat India in an air war, but 
primarily to gain air superiority against Taiwan, if it decides to declare independence).  
The modernization efforts of both air forces represent not only the desire to defend their 
respective territories, but to project force as an emerging regional power.  Depending on 
how long it will take the PLAAF to modernize (estimates range from 10 to 20 more 
years), the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft (led by the Su-30MKI) is presently capable of 
defending Indian territory from a Chinese air attack.  
2. Nuclear Role for Su-30MKI 
In January 2003, India finally announced its nuclear doctrine and the establishment 
of a Strategic Forces Command aimed at removing any existing ambivalence surrounding 
India’s nuclear policy.80  With the formation of this Strategic Forces Command, India 
finally began to institutionalize its nuclear policy of no-first-use and minimum credible 
nuclear deterrence.81  While no mention was made of conventional capability or nuclear 
triad, it is assessed that India’s primary means of nuclear delivery will be from the air until 
the maturity of its ballistic missile capability.82  
Since Pakistan’s military is ultimately responsible for its nuclear program, it has 
weaponized and deployed its nuclear arsenal more efficiently than India’s civilian nuclear 
program, which is just beginning to work with India’s armed forces (reference Table 2 
below, Comparison of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Programs). For instance, the primary 
                                                
79 Despite the concerns of President Bush, the European Union is almost certain to lift the 15-year-old 
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www.janes.com.  Last accessed June 2004. 
81 2003-2004 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 14. 
82 Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 531. 
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delivery means of nuclear weapons for Pakistan is via its advanced ballistic missile 
program, while India’s primary platform of nuclear delivery remains its fighter-bomber 
aircraft.83  Currently, the IAF Mirage-2000H, Su-30MKI, Jaguar S(I), and Mig-27 are the 
platforms capable of delivering nuclear weapons.84  The IAF is more likely to use these 
aircraft as nuclear delivery platforms in the near future because they are already integrated 
into the force structure of the IAF and are considered reliable in terms of safety. 
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Aircraft/Missile Range Source Status
Mirage-2000H 1,205 km France 2 squadrons, 35 planes in inventory
Su-30 MKI 3,000 km Russia 50 planes purchased, 18 in inventory
Jaguar S(I) 850 km UK/France 4 squadrons, 88 planes in inventory
MiG-27 ML 500 km Russia 214 planes in inventory
Prithvi 1 (SS-150) 150 km indigenous Army version, in service
Pritvhi 2 (SS-25) 250 km indigenous Air Force version, tested, in development
Prithvi 3 (Danush) 350 km indigenous Navy version, failed test in 2000, in development
Agni 1 700-900 km indigenous tested in January 20002, in development
Agni 2 2,000-3,000 km indigenous tested in 1999 and 2001, in development
Agni 3 3,500-4,000 km indigenous in early development  
Aircraft / Missile Range Source Status
  F-16 A/B 925 km United States 32 planes in inventory
  Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km France 50 planes in inventory
  Hatf 1 80 D 100 km indigenous in service since mid-1990s
  Hatf 2 (Abdali) 180 km Indigenous/China tested  May 2002, in production
  Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi) 290km Indigenous/China M-11, tested May 2002, in service
  Hatf 4 (Shaheen 1) 600-700 km indigenous/China tested October 2002, in service
  Hatf 5 (Ghauri  1) 1,300-1,500 km indigenous/DPRK No Dong, tested in May 2002, in service
  Hatf 5 (Ghauri  2) 2,000 km indigenous/DPRK No Dong, tested in April2002, in development
  Hatf 6 (Shaheen 2) 2,000 - 2,500 km indigenous/China not yet tested, in development
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While the Su-30MKI has the longest range of fighter in the IAF inventory with a 
combat radius of 1500km these aircraft are still new to the IAF as the first two squadrons 
were inducted in 2002.86  Due to its advanced avionics and extensive combat radius, the 
IAF foresees the Su-30MKI as the most likely candidate to assume the nuclear role over 
the long-term.  The Su-30MKI provides India with the long-range capability to deliver 
nuclear weapons at any strategic target anywhere within Pakistan (reference graph below).  
With the Su-30MKI, India now possesses another platform capable of conducting a 




Figure 4.   India’s Strategic Nuclear Reach from Jodhpur87 
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650km.  Data from The Indian Defense Yearbook 2004, edited by Lt. General (retired) RK Jasbir Singh 
(India:  Natraj Publishers, 2004), 338 and 500-501. 
87 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 537. Note that the Su-30MKI based out of Jodhpur (with a 
combat radius of 1500km) could easily reach any target within Pakistan in a permissive environment (one in 
which India has air superiority over Pakistan). 
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India’s nuclear tests in May of 1998 were conducted to assure its citizens that 
nuclear weapons would protect and promote national security.88  In addition, the party in 
power at the time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), argued that India conducted the 
nuclear tests since China represented a long-term threat to Indian security.89  Since India 
perceives China as its long-term security threat, the employment of the Su-30MKI in a 
nuclear role demonstrates India’s strategic intent to deter and match China.90  In reality, it 
is highly unlikely that India could successfully deliver a nuclear weapon on any significant 
target in China since these aircraft would have to cover such a large distance at low levels 
in order to avoid China’s sophisticated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).91  India 
cannot successfully defeat the PLA’s strategically superior Second Artillery (China’s 
conventional ballistic missile and nuclear strategic rocket forces) so its acquisition of the 
Su-30MKI at least demonstrates to China its resolve in acquiring the most sophisticated 
fighter available to deliver nuclear weapons.  In reality though, the IAF will utilize the Su-
30MKI to fulfill its need for an advanced multi-role fighter in a conventional border 
conflict, not to execute a nuclear attack on China.  If the Su-30MKIs were forward 
deployed along the border with China to execute a nuclear mission they would only get 
1500km into China, well short of the 2500km needed to reach high value targets in 
Beijing (reference graph below). Thus, it will be extremely difficult for the Su-30MKI to 
deliver a nuclear weapon inside China because of the lack of strategic targets within the 
aircraft’s combat radius, the strength of the Chinese IADS, and the caution of the IAF 
leadership to commit a high valued asset on an extremely risky mission.92   
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Figure 5.   India’s Strategic Nuclear Reach from Tezpur93 
 
 
D. IAF PHALCON AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM:  EXPANDING 
INDIA’S ISR CAPABILITIES 
On 29 February 2004, the Israeli government approved a U.S. $1.1 billion deal to 
export three of its Phalcon airborne early warning system to India.94  The agreement 
represents the largest single deal in the history of Israel’s export program and further 
signified the strengthening of Indo-Israeli defense ties.95 The Phalcon airborne early 
warning system essentially gives India the ability to detect aerial threats and serve as a 
platform to direct Indian combat jets on targets.96  Currently, the Israeli Phalcon radar is 
being integrated on the Russian IL-76 transport jets under Indian supervision while the 
software programs are being written by Indian software engineers.97  The operational 
altitude of the Phalcon airborne early warning system will be roughly 30,000 feet, with the 
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capability to monitor low-level activity in the air space for ranges of 500 km.98 The 
Phalcon will be able to track 100 targets, pass real time data to Indian combat fighters, and 
even perform limited ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) and COMINT (Communications 
Intelligence) operations up to 1000 km, automatically data linking this intelligence to 
ground stations.99  The Phalcon airborne early warning system is a force multiplier that 
will maximize India’s air defense capability while also maintaining the option to direct 
IAF combat aircraft on enemy targets.  After the addition of more powerful engines and 
up-to-dated avionics in Russia, followed by the addition of the Phalcon radar suite in 
Israel, the first complete system is expected to be in service by the end of 2006, with the 
finalization by 2009/2010.100 
1. Conventional Role for the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System 
In a conventional role, the proper employment of the Phalcon AWACS (Airborne 
Early Warning and Control System) should meet the IAF’s primary goal of Indian air 
defense.101  With the Phalcon AWACS, the IAF will be able to track any Pakistani aircraft 
that enters Indian airspace and guide IAF fighters to their location accordingly.  
Psychologically, this is a great conventional advantage for India over Pakistan since it 
neutralizes Pakistan’s capability (already limited with aging combat fighters) to deliver 
munitions on Indian targets from the air.  For example, Pakistan’s current Foreign 
Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri argued that the Indian acquisition of the Phalcon 
AWACS, “Will destabilize the whole region, not just South Asia but the Middle East.  It is 
very, very dangerous.”102  While Pakistan struggles to come to terms with the IAF’s 
acquirement of the Phalcon AWACS, it is also extremely susceptible to India being able to 
look well into Pakistan.  The Phalcon AWACS further supports the Indian military’s 
objective of conducting a limited war campaign versus Pakistan since it provides fighter 
aircraft with real time targeting data on Pakistani targets, including Pakistan’s air bases, 
military garrisons, or possible shelters for Kashmiri insurgents. 
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India’s acquisition of the Phalcon AWACS gives it a tactical advantage versus 
China.  For instance, since the Phalcon system can pick out enemy aircraft flying hundreds 
of miles away in all weather, day or night, or even those flying at low altitude, it could 
counter any conventional PLAAF threat in the North or Northeast of India well in 
advance.103  This advanced warning is vital in any conventional confrontation with China 
since India is still modernizing its air defense and interceptor aircraft (already moving in 
the right direction with the Su-30MKI) that will take some time to develop.  The Phalcon 
AWACS closes the qualitative conventional gap with China, giving India the early 
warning it needs to properly defend itself from any “nasty surprises” along the Himalayas 
to avert any future wars with timely and diplomatic action.104  Although it will take some 
time to integrate the Su-30MKI with the Phalcon AWACS, India must accomplish this 
task if it hopes to move towards network centric warfare and keep China somewhat off 
balance.  With India and China’s history of conventional conflict, and mutual suspicions, 
it will be relatively easy for both countries to misconstrue each other’s motives.105  
Therefore, aside from the primary reason of obtaining early warning indications of 
incoming Pakistani aircraft, the IAF also acquired the Phalcon AWACS to substantially 
upgrade its early warning capability to meet any contingency with the PLAAF in the 
Himalayas.106   
2. Nuclear Role for the Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System 
The Phalcon AWACS further tilts the conventional balance in India’s favor vis a 
vis Pakistan, but its utility as a nuclear deterrent role are less advantageous.  For example, 
if the nuclear threshold for Pakistan lowers (highly likely due to India’s massive 
conventional advantage), Pakistan may “go nuclear,” launching nuclear ballistic missiles 
into India as its primary delivery system.  While an airborne Phalcon AWACS could 
identify and vector IAF aircraft to destroy an incoming Pakistani Air Force (PAF) jet 
(either a F-16 A/B or the Mirage 5 PA) equipped with nuclear missiles, it is unlikely that 
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Pakistan would deliver nuclear weapons from the air but use its highly mobile ground-
based nuclear ballistic missiles instead.  A better utilization of the Phalcon AWACS in a 
nuclear role is to “look inside” Pakistan in an effort to identify Pakistan’s mobile ballistic 
missile systems and/or command and control centers.  The Phalcon AWACS could 
provide precise targeting data for nuclear equipped IAF aircraft, directing them through 
“holes” in Pakistan’s air patrols and onwards to the enemy’s strategic targets such as 
Pakistani nuclear storage facilities, command and control centers, or military leadership 
targets.  Since India cannot compete with Pakistan’s nuclear ballistic missile capability, 
the acquisition of the Phalcon AWACS does not provide it with any significant advantage 
versus Pakistan in a nuclear scenario. 
With the close political and military ties between China and Pakistan, China was 
dismayed with India’s purchase of the Phalcon AWACS.  To make matters worse, China 
was denied the very same package from the United States in 2002.107  In order to gain an 
airborne early warning capability, China purchased the A501 airborne early warning 
aircraft from Russia; it is assessed through open sources that two A501 airborne early 
warning aircraft are operational and are operating in the Nanjing Military Region of 
China, opposite Taiwan (see photo below).108   
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Figure 6.   PLAAF A501 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft Observed Over Nanjing, 
China109 
 
China already possesses a strategic nuclear advantage over India (reference Table 
3 below, Chinese Nuclear Forces, as of January 2003), yet it is employing is airborne early 
warning in a conventional role in relation to Taiwan.  Since it will take at least another 
two years for the IAF to employ the Phalcon AWACS in any conventional operations, it is 
assessed that they will not be utilized in any nuclear role versus China (vectoring of IAF 
combat aircraft with nuclear weapons onto Chinese strategic targets) in the foreseeable 
future.  The Phalcon AWACS does not provide India with the ability to deter or match 
China in the realm of nuclear force capabilities since China already possesses a variety of 
its own force multipliers in any nuclear confrontation. 
 
                                                








E. IAF IL-78 AIR-TO-AIR REFUELER 
The Indian Defense Ministry ordered six Il-78 mid-air refueling planes from 
Uzbekistan in October of 2001 for the price of US $150 million.111  The IAF’s induction 
of the Illyushin-78 “Midas” tankers will increase the range and endurance of its mid-air 
refueling capable Su-30MKIs, Mig-29s, and Jaguars fighter aircraft.112  Specifically, the 
mid-air refueler Il-78 will enhance the strike range of the IAF’s Su-30MKIs to more than 
5,000 km.113 The Il-78 has the basic Il-76 platform so the new squadron of Il-78s will be 
based at Agra (see Figure 7. IAF Locations Throughout India below) because all of the 
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infrastructure, equipment, and support personnel for the Il-76 are available there.114  With 
this capability, the IAF is only the sixth air force in the world to possess such a force 
multiplier; aircrew and maintenance personnel have been undergoing training in 
Uzbekistan since the beginning of 2003.115  The Il-78 will enhance the IAF’s strategic 
depth in the IAF’s primary role of air defense, while also increasing the IAF’s offensive 
conventional and unconventional capability to strike targets deep into Pakistan or China. 
 
 
Figure 7.   IAF Locations Throughout India116 
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1. Conventional Role for Il-78 Air- to- Air Refueler 
While the political dialogue between India and Pakistan has resumed, the IAF 
continues to patrol its western border, searching for any enemy infiltrations.117  Now with 
the capability to conduct mid-air refueling, the IAF has yet another conventional 
advantage over the PAF.  With the Il-78 air-to-air refueler (see Figure 8. IAF Il-78 Mid-air 
Refueling of Two IAF Su-30MKIs below), the loitering time of specifically configured 
IAF aircraft (Su-30MKIs come equipped with mid-air refueling probes, while probes for 
the Mirages and Jaguars have already been procured) will be dramatically increased, 
enhancing India’s air defense capabilities.118  Instead of landing to refuel, IAF combat 
aircraft will now be able refuel in flight and quickly attack targets in Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir, or Pakistan itself.   
 
 
Figure 8.   IAF Il-78 Mid-air Refueling of Two IAF Su-30MKIs.119 
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Combined with the IAF’s quantitative advantage over Pakistan, this mid-air 
refueling capability further enhances the IAF’s conventional superiority over its western 
neighbor.  Furthermore, India’s new “Cold Start” military doctrine supports the 
application of eight integrated battle groups led by the Indian Army with elements of the 
IAF and Navy as thrust formations, calling for hard strikes into enemy territory, yet 
limiting them to the point that they should not invite any nuclear retaliation.120  With the 
Il-78 air-to-air refueler, the IAF will be better prepared to support the “Cold Start” 
doctrine by quickly mobilizing combat aircraft to desired forward locations, providing 
these combat aircraft with the necessary “legs” to loiter and strike targets requested by the 
Indian Army.  The Il-78 provides the IAF with the unique capability to project force to 
India’s periphery, enhancing the IAF to deter and defeat the PAF.   
The Il-78 air-to-air refueler also increases the IAF’s combat capability versus 
PLAAF.  According to an anonymous IAF officer, “With such air-to-air refuelers, we will 
be able to fly our air superiority fighters like the Su-30MKIs for over 10 hours at a stretch 
without landing.  Similarly, longer air defense missions would also be possible.  It will 
enhance our capabilities against China.”121  China is still in the process of diversifying its 
air force (in the past, 70 percent of the PLAAF consisted of combat fighters); therefore, 
the PLAAF is pursuing its own mid-air refueler to project power along its borders.122  At 
the present, one regiment of about 10 H-6U tankers, converted from H-6 bombers, support 
a regiment of J-8D fighters, while China is looking to procure Il-78M tankers from Russia 
in the future.123  For the time being, the IAF maintains a competitive advantage over the 
PLAAF’s mid-air capabilities in terms of quality since the IAF Il-78s have already begun 
to conduct  air-to-air refueling  with the IAF’s advanced Su-30MKI.  The PLAAF remains  
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behind the IAF in this realm as India continues to close the conventional gap with China 
by concentrating on equipment which gives it a qualitative advantage to match China’s 
large military. 
2. Nuclear Role for Il-78 Air- to- Air Refueler 
The acquisition of the Il-78 air-to-air refueler does not improve India’s nuclear 
capability versus Pakistan. Air-to-air refuelers are unnecessary in a nuclear role because 
the IAF’s nuclear capable aircraft already cover most of the territory inside Pakistan 
unrefueled.  The only possible role of the air-to-air reufuelers in a nuclear scenario would 
be to keep more combat aircraft airborne and defend against Pakistani aircraft equipped 
with nuclear weapons that may attempt to enter Indian airspace and destroy a strategic 
target with India.  However, this scenario is far-fetched since Pakistan would likely resort 
to its sophisticated and highly mobile nuclear ballistic missile force to attack strategic 
targets within India.  Realistically, the attainment of the Il-78 tanker is more likely to be 
used in a conventional role against Pakistan than a nuclear role.  India’s acquirement of 
these air-to-air refuelers reflects the transition of the IAF from an air defense role to one of 
force projection. 
Due to the sophistication of China’s nuclear triad, it would be unwise for India to 
attempt to refuel an IAF combat fighter (equipped with a nuclear weapon) to strike 
strategic targets deep into China.  While India could argue that it now has the capability to 
deliver such a blow to China, it will still be extremely difficult for this to succeed due to 
China’s advanced sophisticated air defense systems (such as the Russian supplied SA-20 
surface to air missile systems).124  If anything, the IAF’s employment of the Il-78 will 
remain in the conventional arena as India continues to exert its prestige and influence 
along its borders.  The Il-78 air-to-air refueler does not provide India with any nuclear 
advantage in relation to China and will be utilized in a conventional role to apply pressure 
on Pakistan while maintaining the highest degree of strategic air defense throughout South 
Asia.  
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F. U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA  
With a decade of economic growth, relatively stable democracy, and a new foreign 
policy orientation that is a fresh change from its decades-old “non-alignment” policy, 
India has the potential to develop a long-term political and security partnership with the 
United States.125  Despite an erratic history, both countries have come to realize many 
benefits of working together, especially in the fields of economics and security.  India 
ultimately desires the high technology possessed by the United States, and is willing to 
support the United States on various security issues to obtain it; for instance, the Indian 
Navy has offered to patrol the Straits of Malacca against terrorist attacks.126  While 
Congress Party, which came to power in 2004, may backtrack on some of the progress 
made on defense issues by the previous Indian government led by the BJP, talks in the 
Defense Policy Group (the highest forum for U.S.-Indian military engagement) are 
moving forward.  For instance, in recent talks between Douglas Feith, U.S. Undersecretary 
for Defense Policy, and various high-ranking Indian officials, both sides agreed to 
strengthen their cooperation in defense and the global war on terrorism (to include 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and security of sea lanes).127  Since 
America’s main concern today is the global war on terrorism, it would like to see both 
India and Pakistan reach some type of agreement on Kashmir, curbing acts of terrorism in 
the region.  The United States will have to be extremely careful in this endeavor since it 
cannot be seen as the force behind any resolution on Kashmir.  Progress on Kashmir has 
improved gradually, with both Pakistan and India moving forward on high-level 
diplomatic talks.  For example, through the hard work of their respective foreign 
ministers, the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh and the President of Pakistan, 
Pervez Musharraf met each other as the respective leaders of their country for the first 
time in New York (September 2004) for the General Assembly of the United Nations.  
While the United States will have to try to distance itself from any Indian and Pakistan 
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resolution on Kashmir, the United States has strengthened its military to military 
relationship with India over the last couple of years. 
As a growing economic power, India has made a concentrated effort to update its 
military forces in order to secure it goals (deter and defeat Pakistan/deter and match 
China).  The modernization of the IAF analyzed above details the amount of resources 
dedicated to making India one of the most influential and powerful air forces in all of 
Asia.  While the IAF is acquiring the necessary equipment, it has also conducted a number 
of exercises with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in an effort to learn from the USAF and 
improve the actual application of these modern weapon systems.  The purpose of these 
joint exercises are two-fold, India can practice flying with what is considered the most 
powerful air force in the world, and the United States can strengthen bilateral ties with an 
emerging air force in South Asia that may help the United States counter the growing 
strength of China in Asia.   
The latest joint exercise, dubbed “Cope India,” concluded on 25 February 2004 
and took place in Gwalior Air Force Station in central India; it was the biggest joint 
exercise ever between the IAF and the USAF.128  The USAF flew in six F-15C aircraft for 
the exercise, while the IAF joined in with Su-30Ks (Flanker), Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s 
(Fulcrum), MiG-27s (Flogger), and MiG-21s (Bison); the exercise included a series of 
offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air engagements.129  While the IAF did not fly 
the advanced Su-30MKI, the IAF were able to garner a significant amount of information 
from USAF tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Undoubtedly, this training should help in 
the development of the Su-30MKIs air defense and offensive counter-air capabilities.  
Alternatively, the USAF had its first opportunity to train against the Su-30K that will 
enhance the F-15s capability against an aircraft currently in the PLAAF inventory (if 
future conflicts between the USAF and PLAAF should ever present themselves).  While 
the United States has not supplied India with nearly as much security assistance as it has 
to Pakistan  (reference Table 4 below,  US  Assistance  to India, FY 2001-2004, and Brief  
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History of US-Indian Security Ties), exercises like this will significantly improve the 
IAF’s operational capabilities in any air defense or counter-air roles versus both Pakistan 
and China. 
 
Table 4. US Assistance to India, FY 2001-2004 (in millions of US Dollars) 
and Brief History of US-Indian Security Ties130 
 
Another exercise with the U.S. and NATO forces, named Cope Thunder, took 
place in June of 2004.  The IAF participated in a joint exercise with the USAF and other 
air forces, to include Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Canada on 7 July 2004 in 
Alaska.131  Six IAF Jaguar deep-penetration strike aircraft crossed the Atlantic Ocean 
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supported by its two operational Il-78 mid-air refueling tankers in order to participate in 
this multi-national exercises; this was the first time that the IAF’s new air-to-air refuelers 
took part in an exercise outside India.132  Cope Thunder 2004 presented an excellent 
opportunity for the IAF to conduct a competitive air combat exercise with foreign aviation 
forces.  The willingness of the IAF to submit valuable resources, such as the Il-78 mid-air 
refueler represents the amount of importance it attaches to these multilateral exercises.  
The IAF will continue to participate in these exercises for the foreseeable future not only 
to re-establish security ties with the United States but also to increase its conventional and 
unconventional air capabilities against Pakistan or China.   
In addition to the United States security relationship with India, one must also take 
into consideration India’s emergence as a global air force.  With the successes in Cope 
India and Cope Thunder, the IAF is emerging as a world-class air force and has recently 
conducted major exercises in South Africa and with Singapore (in India).  India is 
increasing training with other air forces since this supports its foreign policy of 
multilateralism, thereby limiting the United State’s ability to influence the development of 
the bilaterally.  Since the IAF can only conduct a limited number of exercises a year, this 
may hurt the emerging defense relationship between the United States and India as India 
looks to keep its options open and train with other competitive air forces.  For example, 
due to a strong relationship in respect to arms sales, there is a strong possibility that India 
may conduct air exercises with Israel in the immediate future. 
G. CONCLUSION 
With the modernization of the IAF via the specific acquisitions aforementioned, 
India has achieved a conventional edge over its immediate rival, Pakistan, while catching 
up, in terms of quality, with the PLAAF.  After observing the success of the USAF in the 
Persian Gulf War (and noting the importance of air superiority in any land war), the IAF 
decided to pursue the Su-30MKI, Phalcon AWACS, and Il-78 air-to-air refuelers as the 
force multipliers necessary to defeat the PAF and match the PLAAF in any future 
conventional, or limited wars.  While all three of these weapon systems could act in 
unison to conduct the successful air delivery of a nuclear weapon into Pakistan, the IAF 
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will first concentrate on utilizing these platforms in a conventional role.  The only 
exception may be the IAF’s utilization of the Su-30MKI to deliver a nuclear weapon into 
Pakistan as a secondary strategic strike option.  Due to China’s vast strategic nuclear force 
advantage over India, India’s primary motivation for acquiring these systems is to match 
the PLAAF in any conflict scenario in the Himalayas.  Ironically, the training provided by 
the USAF to the IAF may further destabilize South Asia since Pakistan will perceive 
India’s advanced weapon systems and training as a threat to its own security, forcing 
Pakistan to lower its nuclear threshold.  Then again, China may perceive the IAF’s 
upgrades and exercises with the USAF as a threat to China’s prestige and influence, 
sparking possible arms race between these two Asian rivals.  In addition, the IAF’s 
modernization (through its sophisticated weapon acquisitions and exercises with the 
USAF) may provoke China and Pakistan to reinforce their security ties as a counter-
balance to a perceived Indo-American security alliance.  As the IAF continues to 
modernize and improve its operational capabilities, the United States should not only 
recognize the government of India’s multilateral approach to international relations but the 
potentially damaging side effects of any future joint-training exercises with the IAF so as 
not to escalate the already tense security environment in South Asia.  
This chapter described how and why the IAF is transforming itself into a global 
aerospace force.  While the acquisition of the three new weapon systems mentioned above 
will improve the IAF’s conventional capabilities, they are only part of the vast upgrades 
and acquisitions taking place in other areas of the IAF, including jet trainers, combat 
fighters, UAVs, and air defense systems.  The following chapters will analyze the 
reactions of Pakistan and China to this massive Indian modernization effort.  Special 
attention will be paid to the air forces of these countries to determine how they plan on 








































III. PAKISTANI REACTION:  REVIVING THE PAKISTANI AIR 
FORCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I explore the response of the PAF to IAF modernization.  It is more 
than likely that Pakistan will strengthen its military cooperation ties with China to 
modernize its air force. The reason for this is quite simple: the gap between the PAF and 
IAF today is remarkable.  As of the year 2000, the India-Pakistan fixed wing combat 
aircraft ratio was 2.67:1.133  Pakistan remains economically and politically constrained, 
and will be unable to upgrade its air force’s conventional capabilities in the immediate 
future without significant foreign assistance.  While the modernization of the IAF 
threatens the conventional strength of the PAF and its ability to defend itself against a 
quick and decisive conventional Indian air attack, it does not threaten Pakistan’s strategic 
deterrent of highly mobile and sophisticated nuclear ballistic missiles.  The remainder of 
this chapter analyzes the current disparity between the PAF and the IAF and how this 
airpower imbalance will lower the nuclear threshold in South Asia. 
The current disparity between the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) and the Indian Air 
Force (IAF) began with the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.  After 
Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the United States disengaged itself from Pakistan and 
refused to help modernize Pakistan’s aging air force.  Meanwhile, the Indian economy 
blossomed in the mid-1990s (thanks to economic liberalization reforms in the early 1990s) 
and the IAF embarked on a robust modernization campaign.  With the tense relationship 
between Pakistan and India it is critical to assess how Pakistan plans to counter the IAF’s 
massive conventional advantage and predict whether or not Pakistan’s tactics will 
destabilize the fragile security environment in the subcontinent.  
This chapter addresses the history of the PAF in respect to the modernization of 
the IAF, analyzes the PAF’s current and future development, and assesses the influences 
of the external factors on the PAF.  Special emphasis is placed on how the United States 
                                                
133 Rodney W. Jones, “Strategic Stability and Conventional Force Imbalance: Case of South Asia,” 
Policy Architects International, 
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sassu/publications/StrStab&ConvAsymmetry_Bradford_2.pdf, 6.  Last 
accessed January 2005. 
48 
should engage Pakistan in regards to security assistance. After a thorough analysis of the 
PAF, this chapter reveals how, without foreign assistance, a weaker PAF will be unable to 
challenge the conventional superiority of the IAF in the future, increasing the imbalance 
of airpower and forcing Pakistan to lower the nuclear threshold in South Asia.  
B. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAF 
1. Origins of the PAF and Cold War Influences (1947-1979) 
Before comparing the PAF with the IAF, it is first necessary to understand that the 
origins of the PAF and its development during the Cold War.  At the time of independence 
in 1947, the ten squadrons of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) were abruptly divided; 
seven squadrons (six fighters and one transport) went to India and three squadrons (two 
fighters and one transport) went to Pakistan.134  The PAF’s small inventory included only 
sixteen Tempest fighters and two C-47 Dakotas in serviceable condition (seven Tiger 
Moth aircraft were ferried to Pakistan from Jodhpur in September 1947).135  While the 
IAF aircraft inventory far outnumbered that of the PAF, the PAF made a determined effort 
to develop a professional air force capable of defending itself from any external threat.  
However, to achieve this goal, Pakistan had to look outside its borders and find an ally 
willing to equip its nascent air force.   
After the partition of Pakistan from India, threat perceptions, elite interests and 
strategic ideas drove the process of conflict and alliance formation between the political 
centers of Karachi, Delhi, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.136  The relationship formed 
in the early 1950s between Pakistan and the United States was mutually beneficial.  The 
founder and leader of Pakistan at the time, M.A. Jinnah, sought a U.S. alliance to 
strengthen Pakistan versus its main enemy India; conversely, the United States remained 
interested in Pakistani air bases and Pakistani military manpower to use as a counter-
balance against communist targets.137  The United States saw Pakistan as a strategic 
partner to help counter the Indo-Soviet alliance and prosecute the Cold War in South Asia; 
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for its support, the PAF had a unique opportunity to acquire the military equipment it 
needed to form a professional air force.  Therefore, the alliance of the U.S. and Pakistan 
during the Cold War endured despite differences during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and 
the 1971 War that separated East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh) from West Pakistan.  
India continued to rely upon the Soviet Union to help modernize its air force but during 
the 1970s the PAF could still deliver a significant conventional blow to India from the air.  
This limited parity between both air forces changed significantly following the Soviets 
departure from Afghanistan.   
2. Evolution of PAF during the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (1979- 
1989) 
Throughout the 1980s, the PAF experienced substantial military build-up thanks 
again to significant U.S. military assistance.  The United States sought to strengthen 
military assistance to Pakistan so it could better defend its northern border from the Soviet 
Union while also supporting the American proxy war in Afghanistan.  The Pakistani 
decision-makers, led primarily by General Zia, wanted to strengthen the PAF since the 
previous two wars against India proved that a capable air force could provide decisive 
close-air support and necessary firepower to ground forces (while also enhancing the 
military’s capability to launch an offensive inside enemy territory).138 During this 
timeframe Pakistan’s arms procurement decisions were linked strongly with the strategic 
perception of American security interests in South Asia.139 
The PAF’s major acquisition from the United States in the 1980s included the 
state-of-the-art F-16A fighter aircraft equipped with AIM-9L missiles; all 36 aircraft were 
operational by 1986.140  With improved combat aircraft capable of air interdiction, the 
PAF performed extremely well during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Nine PAF 
squadrons flew a total of 10,939 Close Air Patrol (CAP) sorties (roughly 13,275 hours) on 
the Western Front and shot down eight Soviet aircraft in the process.141  The PAF was 
extremely pleased with the performance of the heat seeking AIM-9L Sidewinders and 
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Washington even took notice by rushing in about 100 Sidewinders to Islamabad in 
1985.142  With the phenomenal performance of the F-16s and Sidewinders, the morale of 
the PAF received a well-needed boost during the 1980s.  On the other hand, India was 
extremely upset at these significant acquisitions and acquired Mig-29s from the Soviets in 
1983-1984.143  As Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the powerful security ties 
between the Washington and Islamabad began to unravel. 
U.S.-Pakistani relations steadily deteriorated at the end of the Afghan-Soviet War 
in 1989.  Furthermore, the imposition of the Pressler Amendment (1985 amendment 
passed to check the development of nuclear arms in Pakistan) further damaged the 
American-Pakistani partnership.144  In retrospect, the United States is partially responsible 
for the covert development of Pakistan’s nuclear program since the Pakistani leadership 
had to find ways to increase its security without the military support from the United 
States.  Regardless, the PAF suffered greatly from the cooling of relations between 
Washington and Islamabad as the delivery of sixty additional F-16s was withheld due to 
the Pressler amendment.  Also, all transactions under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
agreement were suspended to include training and assistance programs, plus spare parts 
for the PAF’s C-130, T-33, T-37 and TPS-43 radars.145  These restrictions forced the PAF 
to rely upon a mix of other foreign aircraft (and foreign technological support) for the 
defense of Pakistan.     
3. PAF Under-Construction (1989-2001)  
The PAF realized that it could not trust the United States’ inconsistent foreign 
policy and decided to strengthen its force structure by refurbishing aircraft and parts 
indigenously.  Government funding for the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) 
increased during this period to support the manufacturing, maintenance, refurbishment, 
and rebuilding of aircraft to include the K-8 jet trainer aircraft, F-6, F-7, Mirage III, and 
even subsystems of the F-16.146  In addition to these indigenous projects, the PAF signed 
three separate contracts for the upgrading of the Chinese F-7s and French Mirage III/Vs so                                                 
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that the parity with the IAF did not diminish any further.147  The PAF’s top brass 
understood the shortcomings of such aircraft as the Chinese F-7 (short endurance) 
compared to the F-16 but were forced to increase security ties with China (that began in 
1966) amidst the restrictions of the Pressler Amendment.148  Due to the shortage of spare 
parts for the F-16, PAF pilots flew less and the morale in the force began to decline.  Not 
until the addition of thirty-two Mirage IIIs in November 1997 did the PAF improve its 
inventory, but regrettably this aircraft would not be able to counter the latest acquisition of 
the IAF, the SU-30.149  With the inability of the PAF to attain the best fighter available 
(whether through corruption, lack of capital, or an inept procurement process), the PAF 
was left with a bevy of dissimilar aircraft to maintain and had lost the technological edge 
and operational readiness it had enjoyed in the past.  Without sufficient U.S. military 
support, the PAF failed to modernize in the 1990s while the IAF began a strong 
modernization push in the middle of the decade. 
4. The End of Parity with the IAF (1990-2001) 
Despite Pakistan’s serious internal threats, such as dangerous Islamic extremists 
and unchecked tribal groups, the greatest threat to the PAF remains the IAF.  Throughout 
the 1990s, the PAF tried to keep pace with the IAF’s gradual modernization.  Economics 
played a major role in the development of the IAF during the 1990s, as India’s economic 
growth rate took off after the liberalization of the economy in 1991.  The poor state of 
Pakistan’s national economy put into question whether or not the government could 
support the armed forces in 1998-1999, especially when the military was looking for about 
$10 billion to be spent over seven years for the acquirement of conventional hardware (in 
addition to the funds needed for the weaponization of a nuclear deterrence).150  Since 
Pakistan was unable to develop its air force, due to a lack of U.S. support, a poor 
economy, and a corrupt bureaucracy, the capabilities of the PAF would be severely 
diminished in the beginning of the twenty first century. 
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Conversely, IAF modernization skyrocketed.  The IAF was the first air force, other 
than the Russian Air Force to receive the Su-30 MK in 1997, a multi-role fighter with 
many advanced capabilities; in addition to the procurement of the Su-30 MK, the local 
manufacture of the fighter was acquired under license by the Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited (HAL) to meet the IAF’s requirement for five Sukhoi squadrons and the 
possibility of exporting it.151  Approximately 120 Su-30 MKI (Modernized, Commercial, 
India) will be manufactured within India with Russian support.152  This acquisition was a 
major blow to the PAF and further stretched the technological disparity of high 
performance aircraft between the IAF and the PAF (reference chart below).   
 
 
Figure 9.   Comparison of the IAF and PAF from 1980 until 2000153 
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The Su-30 MKI represents a quantum leap for the IAF since it is capable of 
projecting power (3000km range with internal fuel only/5,200km range with mid-air 
refueling, longer depending on the condition of the pilot) while moving towards network 
centric warfare with the future integration of India’s airborne early warning platforms.  In 
regards to mid-air refueling and airborne early warning capabilities, the IAF recently 
secured the acquisition of six IL-78 mid air refuelers and two Phalcon Airborne Early 
Warning Systems from Russia and Israel respectfully.  With a mid-air refueling capability 
and airborne early warning system, the IAF is well on its way towards becoming a world-
class air force with the capability to project power beyond its traditional borders to protect 
its national interests.  In the meantime, the gap between the PAF and IAF will continue to 
widen as Pakistan remains fully engaged in domestic issues.  Pakistan’s military resources 
are stretched thin as a majority of the military has taken on the additional duty of 
reconstructing the country’s civil institutions (even to the extent of having soldiers teach 
classes in public schools) to deter the rise of militant Islam.154 
C. PRESENT AND FUTURE PAF DEVELOPMENT  
1. Learning from the Kargil Conflict and the 2001/2002 Crisis 
The Pakistan military made a strategic move to occupy the route from Kargil to 
Ladakh in May of 1999 with the assistance of well-armed Islamist fighters.155  Since this 
was an operation primarily led by the Pakistani Army, the PAF did not contribute much to 
this operation other than in an air defense role.  On the other hand, the IAF was able to use 
its laser technology, newly acquired from the French, mounted upon its Mirage 2000s; 
with this newfound capability, the IAF was able to target the mujahideen fighters in the 
mountain peaks of Kashmir.156  The main obstacles faced by air power in the twenty 
thousand foot peaks of Kargil were the cumulative effect of a high altitude environment, a 
heightened Surface to Air Missile (SAM) threat, and equipment and training deficiencies 
that diminished the effectiveness of Close Air Support (CAS) as a source of responsive 
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fire in support of ground maneuver.157   While the PAF did not play a major role in the 
Kargil operation, both air forces gained invaluable experience on how to conduct high 
altitude air operations in support of ground troops that the U.S. would later face in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (this time in Afghanistan).  Towards the end of the 21st 
century, it appeared that the PAF faced a more difficult task than ever in countering the 
IAF’s advantage in numbers, modernity, and experience; chiefly, the IAF became more 
capable of sustaining across-the-board missions ranging from air interdiction/strike, to air 
defense, to ground support.158 
While both air forces gained a significant amount of knowledge in regards to high 
altitude combat during the Kargil conflict, the IAF discovered that it needed to improve its 
mobilization of forces following the 2001/2002 crisis.  During this crisis, IAF fighter 
aircraft moved from Northern India (deployed to protect the border with China) to 
Western India to bring massive firepower in any conventional war with Pakistan.  Since it 
took the IAF days to move its combat aircraft to the Western border, the IAF is now 
dedicated to supporting the Indian Army’s “Cold Start” doctrine whereby smaller 
combined units can be quickly deployed to strike decisively.159  If this new doctrine is to 
come to fruition for the Indian military, it will severely threaten the security of Pakistan 
since the international community would not have the time to react and step in as it did 
during the 2001/2002 crises.  Therefore, it is incumbent on the PAF to not only improve 
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2. The PAF’s Air Defense and Nuclear Roles 
In any conventional war between Pakistan and India, the role of the PAF is to fully 
safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.160  Since the IAF will continue 
to develop precision-guided munitions capable of targeting militant camps and militant 
logistics capabilities across the Line of Control (LOC), the PAF will have to continually 
enhance its air defense capabilities.  In addition to its traditional air defense role, the PAF 
must be capable of maintaining its nuclear role if it hopes to deter the IAF’s adventures 
into limited war.161  Therefore, the PAF should pay as much attention to its nuclear 
capabilities as its conventional air defense capabilities in order to deter an Indian 
conventional military attack on Pakistani territory.   
The PAF’s doctrine and employment for the aerial delivery of nuclear weapons is 
very advanced.  For instance, Pakistan has better control of its nuclear capable aircraft 
than India since the Pakistan’s military controls all facets of nuclear production and 
employment beneath the Strategic Plans Division (SPD).  On the contrary, the Indian 
military has only just begun to establish a Strategic Command responsible for India’s 
nuclear weapons triad.  The Indian military continues to struggle with civilian control of 
the nuclear weapons program.  While India outnumbers Pakistan in all manners of nuclear 
delivery systems, Pakistan has an asymmetric nuclear advantage thanks to its advanced 
strategic nuclear strike doctrine and its nuclear capable F-16s flown by extremely skillful 
pilots.  Thus, the PAF will continue to improve its nuclear doctrine and employment since 
this nuclear role is essential to Pakistan’s survival as it would be unable to counter a 
conventional Indian attack through conventional military means.   
While the PAF continues to improve its nuclear doctrine, it has been unable to 
modernize its conventional doctrine.  Basically, the PAF’s conventional doctrine is 
struggling to keep pace with a rapidly evolving IAF doctrine based on rapid mobilization 
of forces, precision strike capabilities, and highly capable Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.  The consequences of Pakistan falling behind the latest 
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technological and doctrinal advances versus India are extremely dangerous.  With the 
IAF’s push towards network centric warfare, the IAF will be able to not only deter or even 
intercept a PAF nuclear attack but also coerce Pakistan with accurate attacks on specific 
targets (thanks to the IAF’s advancements in airborne early warning, space, command and 
control, and ISR).  If Pakistan wants to increases its chances of successfully conducting a 
nuclear attack from the air on strategic Indian targets it needs to invest heavily in ISR 
assets and move towards network centric warfare.  The PAF’s nuclear doctrine will begin 
to meet significant obstacles if the PAF cannot compete in a campaign of network centric 
warfare whereby all systems (missile systems on the ground, ground troops, ISR assets, 
and nuclear capable platforms) are interconnected.  The PAF risks the chances of being 
defeated by the IAF in not only a nuclear conflict, but a conventional or even limited war 
if it cannot successfully integrate all of its resources.  With this in mind, and with little 
support from Western sources, Pakistan is looking more and more to China to supply it 
with the assets mentioned above to improve not only its aerial nuclear option but 
modernize many facets of the PAF. 
3. Increased Defense Ties with China to Modernize the PAF 
Although Pakistan has committed itself to fight the War on Terrorism, the United 
States has not returned the favor to Pakistan by providing the equipment necessary to 
modernize its air force.  Since the Pakistani military perceives the IAF as a real and 
menacing threat, it will do everything in its power to develop an air force that can counter 
the IAF’s superiority.162  In the next fiscal year the majority of the Pakistani defense 
budget will be dedicated to improving the status of the PAF.163  With strong aerospace 
defense ties between both China and Pakistan already in place, the PAF is well on its way 
to modernizing its forces.  For instance, a joint venture between the Chinese Chengdu 
Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) and Pakistani Aeronautical Complex (PAC) will 
begin initial production of 16 aircraft in 2006; the designation of the aircraft in the PAF 
will be the Joint Fighter-17 (JF-17) Thunder (reference photo below).164  
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Figure 10.   PAF Joint Strike Fighter (JF-17)165 
 
The senior Pakistani leadership remains convinced that India will continue to play 
the “China card” in order to receive military aid and dual use technologies from the United 
States.  Since Pakistan perceives a long-term Indo-American alliance as a major security 
threat, it will work with China to develop new technologies.  China has already begun to 
increase its research and development in regards to developing high-tech systems and has 
already made some significant breakthroughs in not only state of the art aircraft but 
electronic warfare as well.166  Pakistan believes that with its unprecedented economic 
growth, China will be able to fund its defense projects and advance the modernization of 
the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).  In addition, a senior member of the 
Pakistani Army argued that in ten to fifteen years China will have a modern air force.167  
Therefore, the PAF will directly benefit from the modernization of the PLAAF as it will 
gain a significant amount of assistance in the fields of combat aircraft, electronic warfare, 
and ISR.  Unless the United States can somehow improve its defense relationship with 
Pakistan, China will become Pakistan’s primary supplier of military hardware for the 
foreseeable future. 
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D. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE PAF 
1. The State of Pakistan after 9/11 
After the attacks of September 11, the Bush administration quickly realized that 
Pakistan was indispensable in pursuing its campaign in Afghanistan to both break up Bin 
Laden’s terrorist networks and put an end to the Taliban regime.168  If America’s War on 
Terrorism is to succeed, it needs the help of not only Pakistan’s military bases, but 
Pakistani intelligence as well.  Security ties between both countries were immediately 
renewed as all U.S. sanctions connected to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (mainly 
the 1978 Symington Amendment and the 1990 Pressler Amendment) were lifted once 
Musharraf pledged his “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”169  Pakistan 
was immediately propelled into the world spotlight, and Musharraf, the military general 
who rose to power only after a military coup in 1999, became America’s most important 
ally in the war against terrorism.   
Even before being tossed into the international spotlight, Musharraf tried to pull 
Pakistan out of its diplomatic isolation (widely considered a pariah nation after the nuclear 
weapons tests in the spring of 1998); therefore, in the summer of 2001, Musharraf, who by 
then had become President, made the first high-level visit of a Pakistani leader to India in 
over 14 years.170 Unfortunately, such diplomatic efforts and the war on terrorism couldn’t 
ease the tense relationship between Islamabad and Delhi.  An attack on India’s Parliament 
on December 13, 2001 by a suicide bomber further strained this relationship.171  As both 
countries mobilized their forces along their shared borders in the spring of 2002, 
escalating the chances of an all out nuclear war in South Asia, cooler heads prevailed on 
both sides with pressure from Washington.  Afterwards both countries eventually began 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to improve their relationship (mainly through the 
mechanism of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, SAARC).  While 
Pakistan improved its international prestige, badly damaged during the 1990s, by aligning 
itself with the United States after September 11th, it still had trouble bringing the Islamists 
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in Pakistan in line (exemplified by the two terrorist assassination attempts on Musharraf’s 
life towards the end of 2003).  The relationship between the United States and Pakistan 
must remain strong if the United States is going to find elements of Al Qaida and the 
Taliban along the Afghan – Pakistan border and if Musharraf is going to lead his people 
out of dismal poverty and discontent with American aid. 
The latest strain on American-Pakistani relations is the pardon of nuclear scientists 
A.Q. Khan, considered the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear program,” by President Musharraf 
after Khan admitted that he had proliferated nuclear weapons.  It is apparent that 
Washington exhibited significant restraint in respect to this event and highlights how 
important a strong U.S.-Pakistani relationship is to the United States.  While allegations 
exist that there is an “understood agreement” whereby Pakistan would allow U.S. troops 
inside Pakistan to track down Al-Qaida and Taliban elements as long as the United States 
let Musharraf handle Khan, this information has yet to be verified.  Regardless, Islamabad 
revamped its military forces to deal with the internal security problems along the Pakistan 
– Afghanistan border, pleasing Washington by showing the U.S. that Pakistan was willing 
to take a proactive stance against terrorism; hopefully these measures were not too little, 
too late. 
2. U.S.-PAF Relations after 9/11:  F-16s to the PAF? 
While the new relationship between the United States and Pakistan is one mainly 
based on necessity (fighting the War on Terrorism for the United States and state survival 
for Pakistan), the relationship between the United States and the PAF has been slow-
going.  On the positive side, the immediate lifting of sanctions following 11 September 
2001 not only meant that Pakistan would be able to obtain loans from America, but also 
send soldiers to the U.S. for military training (something that was impossible since 
1990).172  Then again, in a December 2001 visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld to Islamabad, Rumsfeld dodged Musharraf’s request for a delivery of F-16s 
(originally 28 F-16s were to be sent to the PAF, but the order was cancelled due to 
Pakistani nuclear testing in the 1990s); instead, Rumsfeld only offered up parts for the 
existing PAF F-16s.173   
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Security ties between the United States and Pakistan were finally reaffirmed when 
President Musharraf’s visited the United States just last year and President Bush 
announced that the U.S intended to provide Pakistan with $3 billion in economic and 
military aid over the next five years.174  So where does this leave the American– PAF 
relationship today?  In respect to the fight on terrorism, the PAF was one of the first 
services to offer its help as President Musharraf accepted a U.S. request for a long-term 
presence at an air base in Jacobabad, southwestern Pakistan (a standby air base for the 
PAF) shortly after 11 September 2001, to serve as a key facility for the U.S. military’s 
peacekeeping or counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.175  In terms of actual aircraft, 
Islamabad agreed to purchase six C-130 military transport aircraft from Lockheed Martin 
for approximately $75 million under a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant (reference 
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan).176  Furthermore, Congress was notified in 2003 of 
another pending Foreign Military Sale arrangement with Pakistan reportedly worth $155 
million that will allow Pakistan to receive six Aerostat surveillance radars (this would 
mark the first major arms sale to Pakistan in over a decade).177  While these surveillance 
radars will release some of the pressure placed on PAF air patrols, Washington’s current 
military aid plan is focused exclusively on combating terrorism; however, the PAF is more 
concerned with updating its fighter aircraft in respect to its most significant threat, the 
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While Washington has not said “yes” or “no” to the sale of F-16s to the PAF in the 
past, the PAF intends to take up the United States’ offer to upgrade the existing F-16s with 
capabilities that would allow the service to add a Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile 
(BVRAAM), improve digitized electronics, update structural support changes, and 
improve radars.179  The PAF prefers the F-16 option because it already possesses the 
necessary logistical training infrastructure to support the aircraft.180  There are indications 
that the PAF’s well-known desire to add additional F-16s necessary to close the gap of 
high-tech aircraft in respect to India may actually take shape in the immediate future.  In a 
statement made by the Pakistan Air Chief (Air Marshall Kaleem Saadat) on 14 September 
2004, Pakistan may expect some F-16s from the US while delivery of two of the six C-
130s is expected in December.181   Air Marshall Saadat was quoted as saying, “Pakistan 
had asked for 70 F-16s but the Americans had indicated that they might settle for 18 but 
that might happen after the US presidential elections.”182   Referring to the difficulties 
Pakistan had to face due to “stringent political decisions by the US administration” he 
said, “Pakistan Air Force is looking for various options to meet its hi-tech requirements; 
that Swedish Griffin and China’s F-10 remain leading contenders; that whichever of these 
aircraft is selected, it will meet our high-tech requirements.”183   
Thus, the PAF will exhaust all options in acquiring a high-tech combat aircraft to 
meet its modernization needs and counter the IAF’s rapid modernization efforts.  For 
example, Pakistan agreed in July to purchase 50 Mirage III/V fighter jets and 150 Mirage 
III/V engines from Libya to maintain the PAF’s existing fleet of Mirages (estimated at 180 
aircraft).184  With this purchase it appears that the PAF is dedicated to its fleet of Mirages 
to support its multirole and anti-ship roles for the immediate future.185 As mentioned 
earlier, defense ties with China will certainly strengthen over the long-term as the 
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relationship is mutually beneficial for both parties; Pakistan can upgrade its antiquated 
weapons systems while China’s relationship with Pakistan will continue to irritate India 
forcing India to concentrate military resources on both borders.  
3. PAF Concerns and Other Possible Acquisitions 
While the Pakistani military is well aware of the importance of destroying terrorist 
elements within its own borders, the PAF is more concerned with the threat of the IAF’s 
rapid modernization (as it was a decade ago).  Again it is important to emphasize the 
importance of Pakistan’s security perceptions in the region.  The PAF is very concerned 
with the perceived pro-India policy of the United States.  It makes sense that the United 
States to have a vested interest in the economic and military strength of India to counter-
balance the threat of the regional hegemonic power, China.  As of late, the PAF’s 
perceived notions of a pro-India policy may be well founded due to the recent air combat 
exercise held in India.  In February 2004, in the combat exercises codenamed “Cope India 
04,” the Pacific Command of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) pitted its F-15C air superiority 
fighters against the IAF’s Mig-21, Mig-29, Sukhoi-30, and Mirage 2000 at Gwalior Air 
Base in the central state of Madhya Pradesh.186  This exercise simulated Beyond Visual 
Range Combat, high value asset protection, and a number of the low and high altitude 
combat missions.187  While joint exercises between the USAF and the IAF are a serious 
concern, the PAF is more concerned with the increased capabilities of the IAF’s hi-tech 
fighters (specifically the BVRAAM capability of the Su-30 MKI with an estimated range 
of 16 to 20 nautical miles) and the IAF’s latest attainment of the jointly developed 
American – Israeli Phalcon airborne early warning system.188  Currently the PAF does not 
have an answer to the Su30MKIs BVRAAM capability.189  In addition, the IAF Phalcon 
AWACS will threaten the PAF’s air defense system (by monitoring ground control 
intercept communications) and deny the PAF the ability to utilize terrain masking in 
mountainous areas, such as Kashmir.  Even more threatening to Pakistan’s security is that 
the  IAF  Phalcon  AWACS may be capable of identifying the deployment and disposition  
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of Pakistan’s strategic assets (nuclear force of ballistic missiles and command and control 
nodes) resulting in the possible loss of Pakistani secrecy vital to the maintenance of 
Pakistan’s minimum deterrence.190 
Since network centric warfare will be the key to victory in any conventional or 
nuclear conflict, a major priority for the PAF is the procurement of a six to ten mid-sized 
airborne early-warning and control aircraft, like the E-2C Hawkeye or a variant of the 
Embraer EMB-145 to control the skies.191  The PAF is tentatively scheduled to receive 
seven Swedish ERIEYE Airborne Early Warning and Control System equipped on SAAB 
aircraft that should help shore up its air defense capabilities versus the IAF.192  Lastly, the 
PAF is interested in obtaining a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions along the country’s highly contested borders 
with a range of 200 to 500 kilometers.193  The PAF may have a good chance of obtaining 
these UAVs if it can convince the U.S. government that they will be utilized to help fight 
the war on terror.  The direction and competitiveness of the PAF will depend upon its 
ability to modernize and obtain the high-tech fighters, AWACS/AEW platforms, and 
UAVs or else it will continue to fall further behind the technological advancement of its 
main threat, the IAF. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The PAF is content to continue military exchanges and joint exercises with the 
United States, but in reality, it would prefer the acquisition of advanced military 
equipment to counter its main threat, the IAF.194  The United States is hesitant to provide 
full-scale military support (in the form of F-16s or advanced AWACS/AEW platforms) 
because  it  believes that Pakistan first needs to allocate its resources towards its economy,  
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educational system, human rights, and internal security.  The PAF will receive additional 
U.S. military equipment in the immediate future, but it may be heavily weighted to those 
systems that help fight terrorism.   
Without significant foreign assistance from the United States, Pakistan will 
significantly increase its defense ties with China to help it rebuild its air force.  By 
continuing to cooperate closely with China, Pakistan will not only obtain sophisticated 
fighter aircraft but would achieve its goal of keeping the IAF somewhat off balance.  
Future American policy recommendations for these two South Asian nuclear powers are 
difficult to formulate since neither will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) yet 
are not seen as potential targets of counter-proliferation by the American government.  In 
order to limit Sino-Pakistani military cooperation and improve upon its strong bilateral 
relationship, Washington should sell Pakistan F-16s.  If Washington does not sell F-16s to 
Pakistan, the IAF will continue to widen its conventional superiority versus the PAF 
forcing Pakistan to strengthen its nuclear program and further escalating the chances of 
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IV. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO IAF’S MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As a successful economic, nuclear-capable and democratic nation-state, India will 
threaten the credibility and regional prestige of the communist-led People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) for the foreseeable future.  In response to a more powerful India, China has 
consistently sought to maintain and expand the autonomy of the smaller South Asian 
states while avoiding any direct confrontations against New Delhi.195  Alternatively, 
China’s primary security concerns are the possible independence of Taiwan, an unstable 
Korea, the remilitarization of Japan, and the potential hostility of the United States.196   
While most American defense analysts focus exclusively on China’s military capabilities 
in a Taiwan scenario, little attention is paid to a potential conflict with South Asia’s 
greatest military power, India.  It is all the more baffling to understand this lack of 
analysis since Indian pride has not yet fully recovered from the humiliating defeat dealt to 
it by China in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.  Furthermore, the amazing pace of IAF 
modernization threatens to manifest itself into an arms race between the IAF and the 
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), threatening regional stability.  This chapter 
analyzes China’s reaction (specifically, the response of the PLAAF) to IAF modernization 
in order to determine whether or not the robust pace of the IAF’s modernization threatens 
Chinese national security. My analysis reveals that China will maintain a nuclear 
advantage over India for the long term but is currently incapable of decidedly defeating 
India in a conventional air war.   
As a rational actor in a chaotic world, China will defend its security interests at all 
costs, even if it means joining with weaker states to confront a global hegemonic power.  
Therefore, China utilizes its diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national 
power to support a balance of power approach to the unstable security dynamic in South 
Asia.  Since the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia and the continued development of 
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nuclear weapons in the region, have made it so China can no longer neglect this 
significant security threat along its southern border.  Furthermore, as an emerging Asian 
power, India has begun to threaten China’s credibility throughout the region.  Thus, this 
chapter assesses these two major issues by analyzing the Sino-Indian relationship in three 
dimensions:  China’s threat perceptions and overall relationship with India, China’s 
nuclear capabilities versus India’s, and China’s conventional air force capabilities 
compared with India.  Each section analyzes China’s specific threat perceptions towards 
India and assesses whether or not the PRC is capable of defeating India in any major 
nuclear or conventional air war.  
B. CHINA’S THREAT PERCEPTION AND SINO-INDIAN TIES 
In May of 1998, India declared that it had successfully conducted a series of 
nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert (located in northwest India), which caught the entire 
international community by complete surprise.  Only a few weeks later, Pakistan 
responded to India’s nuclear tests by conducting its own in the Chagai Hills of Baluchistan 
(located in southwest Pakistan).  With the arrival of nuclear weapons to South Asia, China 
immediately turned its attention to the potential security implications of this new threat 
along its southern border.  From a realist point of view, China perceives itself as a 
legitimate nation-state in an unstable international system where lasting peace is not 
possible but temporary peace may be attainable by building coalitions and alliances 
among weaker states against the hegemonic ambitions of others.197  Therefore, Beijing 
endorses a balancing strategy in respect to both India and Pakistan as the best way to 
maintain peace and stability in this volatile region.  Since China has long considered South 
Asia to be its own “backyard” (China shares a 3400 kilometer border with India and 
Pakistan), it is not only frustrated with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan, but also fearful that countries such as Japan (a potential enemy), may now seek 
to  acquire  nuclear  weapons  for their own specific security interests.198  In this section, I  
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explain China’s threat perceptions and initial reaction to the 1998 nuclear tests and in also 
explain how China has dealt with India diplomatically, economically, and militarily since 
India’s nuclear tests.  
1. China’s Present Threat Perception and Outlook on Global Nuclear 
Weapons Development 
China’s overall threat perception and outlook on global nuclear weapons 
development drives its balancing strategy in South Asia.  China’s principal security 
concerns are the erosion of its nuclear deterrent vis a vis an increasingly aggressive 
American national/theater missile defense plan and Taiwan’s opposition to 
reunification.199  In addition to these two major threats, China does not trust a 
technologically advanced and plutonium-rich Japan, nor is it comfortable with how Russia 
may respond to a U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system.200  With regional 
threats throughout its periphery (to include Russia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, and 
America’s growing presence in Central Asia), China cannot defend itself without 
balancing with other weaker states to counter these traditional enemies.  In respect to 
nuclear weapons development in South Asia, China has traditionally supported Pakistan’s 
efforts in obtaining advanced ballistic missiles in order to counter the emerging strength of 
India’s own nuclear program.201  Since both China and India share similarities that could 
cause them to become rivals within world economic and political structures in the 
foreseeable future, China will continue its strong military ties with Pakistan as a means of 
keeping India “pre-occupied.”202  While China’s immediate security concerns are the 
emergence of an American national missile defense system and the Taiwan’s opposition to 
reunification, its ability to contain nuclear weapons development to South Asia will have 
long  term  security  implications.   In order to better assess how China will approach India  
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as a potential enemy in the future, it is vital to understand how the PRC reacted to India’s 
nuclear tests and how it has approached India through diplomatic and economic channels 
since those tests. 
2. China’s Reaction to India’s 1998 Nuclear Tests and Current Sino-
Indian Diplomatic Ties 
One of India’s main reasons for conducting its 1998 nuclear tests was to protect 
itself from a nuclear China.203  Chinese statements after India’s nuclear tests refute this 
point.  For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
stated on 14 May 1998 that, “Ever since China possessed nuclear weapons, it has 
advocated the comprehensive prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons 
unilaterally and unconditionally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear free zones.”204  Therefore, China quickly 
condemned India’s nuclear tests through open diplomatic channels arguing that India did 
not need a deterrent to China’s growing military power, but that India wanted to prove 
itself as the main power of South Asia.”205   
China’s initial reaction to India’s nuclear tests was one of condemnation.  Today, 
Chinese officials are making significant efforts towards improving historically strained 
political ties with India in an effort to balance the tense security environment in South 
Asia.  For instance, Sino-Indian cooperation has slowly improved over the last few years 
since both countries have worked towards resolving its boundary issues.206  During Prime 
Minister Atal Vajpayee’s July 2003 visit to India, he signed an agreement whereby India 
for the first time referred to Tibet as Tibet Autonomous Region, China’s name for it.207  In 
return, China recognized India’s claims to the Himalayan state of Sikkim by agreeing to a 
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border trade regime with adjoining areas of China.208  The border dispute is still far from 
over as India claims part of Chinese-controlled northern Kashmir and the remote area of 
Aksai Chin while China claims large parts of the northeastern India.209 
As India’s population and prestige in the international community continue to 
grow, China has decided to expand political ties with India as it seeks multipolarization in 
the international political arena.210  China remains optimistic about future Sino-Indian ties 
as both countries have the capability to promote security, stability, and prosperity over 
most of Asia if they decide to cooperate with each other.  For instance, Dai Bingguo, the 
Chinese special representative on the Sino-Indian border issue and vice minister of foreign 
affairs, argued that, “We appreciate and support all positive efforts that help ease and 
stabilize the South Asian situation…we sincerely hope that Sino-Indian relations can rise 
to a new level.”211  While bilateral relations are gradually improving between both 
countries, Beijing’s insistence on Indian nuclear rollback and New Delhi’s demand for 
Chinese clarification of its suspected nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan will 
potentially damage full scale cooperation between both countries in the immediate 
future.212 
On a secondary note, China will continue to try to balance the security dynamic 
between India and Pakistan by continuing its diplomatic support to its traditional ally, 
Pakistan.  While China perceives Pakistan as an important partner in the war on terrorism, 
it is also well aware that a strong Pakistan will help balance India’s growing power.  China 
is constantly promoting exchanges between itself and Pakistan to gain Pakistan’s 
allegiance and foster greater parity in South Asia.  For instance, as recently as 14 Dec 
2004, Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said before leaving to China that, “Pakistan 
and China are strategic partners that play a major, moderating influence in this part of the 
world…we will meet with the leaders of China to discuss diplomatic, political, and 
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economic issues to take our friendship to greater heights.”213 Expect political ties between 
Beijing and Islamabad to strengthen as China seeks to promote a strong Pakistan that can 
keep India preoccupied and perhaps even slow down India’s growing strength in the 
region.  Therefore, China continues to exert its diplomatic power to influence the security 
situation in South Asia in an attempt to not only control nuclear weapons development, 
but also contain an increasingly powerful India.   
3. Beijing’s Economic Ties with New Delhi 
As the eighth largest economy in the world with an average double digit Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate over the last twenty-five years, China remains one 
of the world’s largest manufacturing bases.  Conversely, India’s GDP growth rate has also 
expanded greatly over the last ten years, as India becomes the global base for Information 
Technology (IT) services.214  As India’s economy continues to grow, it is very likely that 
China will see India as an economic competitor that may threaten China’s influence 
throughout all of Asia.  With India’s rapid economic growth and unchecked nuclear 
weapons program, China may perceive India as trying to exert its influence outside of 
South Asia.  India, like China, is already looking towards strengthening its trade 
relationships with Japan, South Korea, and a number of Southeast Asian nations.  While 
trade ties between both countries are gradually increasing (Sino-Indian trade volume in the 
early 1990s was only about $200 million, but last year it reached $7.6 billion), India’s 
trade has dramatically increased with a number of different countries.215  China does not 
have the skills to compete with India in the global IT sector and India is beginning to 
make inroads in the Asian manufacturing sector.  India is gradually moving into the 
manufacturing industry through Japanese and Korean companies investing heavily in the 
Indian auto-making industry.  Therefore, China can only exert limited economic influence 
upon India (in terms of trade, tariffs, etc.).  On the other hand, China will continue to 
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invest the money it gains from global trade on the modernization of its military and 
nuclear weapons programs that will undoubtedly threaten India’s long term security.216 
4. Beijing’s Military Relationship with New Delhi 
Since the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War, Beijing has conducted only limited 
military exchanges with New Delhi.  As a result of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, China 
realized that it would have to modernize its military and upgrade its nuclear arsenal in 
response to this new security threat along its southern border.  While mutual suspicion still 
exists in regards to the specific military and nuclear weapons modernization programs in 
both countries, Beijing has recently sought to strengthen multi-polar security by 
welcoming Indian military forces in a variety of exercises and war games.  Beijing’s goal 
is to neutralize U.S. unilateralism by promoting the development of global multilateralism 
in which both China and India would have a greater interest.217  China’s foreign policy 
approach in terms of security has made some moderate progress in Sino-Indian military 
relations.  For example, the Indian Defense Ministry declared in May of 2003 that the two 
armies will carry out mutual warship visits and that India will send its military officers to 
study at Chinese military colleges.218  Specifically, Chinese and Indian navies conducted 
joint search-and-rescue exercises in the East China Sea waters near Shanghai on 14 
November 2004; this was the first joint military exercise since the two countries formally 
established diplomatic relations.219  Beijing will continue to explore future military 
training exercises with New Delhi since it allows Beijing to maintain some form of 
influence in South Asian security.  By remaining engaged with the major military power 
of South Asia, Beijing feels that it can better monitor New Delhi’s true military aspirations 
in Asia. 
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5. Summing Up China’s Threat Perceptions of South Asia – India on the 
Mind 
The development and modernization of nuclear weapons in South Asia remains a 
major security concern for Chinese defense planners.  In order to confine nuclear weapons 
development to South Asia and promote stability in the region, China has adapted a 
balanced strategy towards India and Pakistan.  As a legitimate nation-state in an unstable 
international system, Beijing utilizes its traditional elements of diplomatic, economic, and 
military powers to promote a balanced strategy with India and Pakistan in an effort to ease 
tensions between these two nuclear states.  Since China is stronger than Pakistan, China 
will have more success in exerting its military and economic instruments of power upon 
its traditional ally.  With respect to India, China will have to rely more on diplomacy since 
it cannot influence India using military force or by applying economic pressure.  While 
there is still time for cooperation between both China and India, it is most likely that these 
two countries will become peer competitors and potential enemies over the long term, 
especially if the United States continues to apply pressure on a nuclear capable India as a 
counterbalance to a strong China.  China’s balanced approach to the development of 
nuclear weapons in South Asia will be successful over the short term; however, with an 
increasingly powerful Indian military and economy, China’s balanced approach will be 
difficult to sustain over the long term and will eventually threaten China’s security in its 
own “backyard.”  With a better understanding of China’s threat perceptions in South Asia, 
especially with respect to India’s emergence as a regional power and potential enemy, it is 
essential to explore whether or not China is capable of defeating India in a nuclear war. 
C. ASSESSING CHINA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY VERSUS INDIA 
China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964.  Since then, China has made 
moderate progress in the development of its nuclear weapons program.  In order to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nation-states in particular to India, China 
became a member of the world’s only legitimate nuclear club, as defined by the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  The other four members are the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, and Russia.  India is not a member of this exclusive club and therefore 
covertly developed its own nuclear weapon program, which was ultimately revealed by 
the nuclear tests it conducted in May of 1998.  While India will continue to develop its 
nuclear weapons program, it will not be able to catch up with China in the immediate 
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future since China has had more time and has invested more resources into its nuclear 
program than India.  Therefore, I will assess China’s nuclear doctrine and then compare 
China’s nuclear capability versus that of India’s to show why China can defeat India in a 
nuclear war. 
1. China’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy 
Since the PRC has not released its official nuclear doctrine and strategy, most of 
what we know comes from studies by members of the PLA, statements by prominent 
PRC/PLA leaders or other scholarly journals.  From these sources, it is clear that China 
faces the prospect of restoring a minimum deterrence that takes into account possible 
deployment of a U.S. missile defense system but may also have to look into a limited 
deterrence with regard to India or even an expansion of its arsenals to develop a limited 
deterrence across the board.220  In order to be prepared for any of these options, China’s 
nuclear doctrine and strategy appear to be focused on a deterrent of any of the nuclear 
powered states that may threaten China’s national security.  In light of this, China remains 
dedicated towards spending the majority of its defense budget on creating a viable nuclear 
force.  Specifically, Chinese weapons modernization efforts are currently focused on 
achieving greater range, payload, accuracy, survivability, and tactical advantage through 
the deployment of the DF-31 missile, the possible deployment of multiple warheads, and 
the deployment of short range-missiles.221 The following section will further explore 
China’s nuclear capability and analyze how effectively it could strike strategic targets 
within India. 
2. China’s Nuclear Capability 
The most ambitious military modernization efforts are currently taking place in 
China’s strategic (or nuclear) rocket forces, known as the PLA Second Artillery.  China 
assesses ballistic missiles as the best instrument for securing its goals in Taiwan without 
actual invasion.222  Hence, China’s growing force of approximately 500 Short Range 
Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), believed to be based in the Nanjing Military Region directly 
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opposite Taiwan, represent the greatest threat to regional stability in Asia.223  The gradual 
improvement of precision in these conventional, tactical ballistic missiles greatly threatens 
not only Taiwan’s ability to defend itself in any major conflict but India’s security since 
China could easily target Indian airfields and military command centers if these SRBMs 
were deployed along the Sino-Indian border.  Furthermore, these SRBMs may be quickly 
weaponized to carry nuclear weapons creating an even greater threat to Indian security.  
China is continuing development of SRBMs because it believes that if the United States 
were to enter a conflict between China and Taiwan, its ballistic missile force would be the 
best way to even the playing field against such a technologically superior enemy.224 The 
Chinese put great faith in the modernization of their ballistic missile force (in terms of 
increased production and precision) to best support their security goals of protecting 
China, reclaiming Taiwan and deterring India.  With additional developments in 
conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), China’s conventional 
and nuclear missile strike force will threaten China’s neighbors, India in particular, 
symbolizing the PLA’s power and influence in the region.225 
The PLA’s Second Artillery is doing a decent job of overcoming its traditional 
restrictions (lack of funds and training) to develop a respectable SRBM capability 
essential in intimidating China’s neighbors.  While China has developed a full range of 
ballistic missiles, possesses a nuclear triad of forces, and is accelerating its development in 
new missiles, it still remains behind the other four nuclear powers and suffers from 
weaknesses in the following:  transitioning from liquid rocket fuel to solid rocket fuel, 
lack of strategic reconnaissance platforms, unprepared (not hardened) silos, GPS 
technology, and most importantly, the ability to launch on warning (since the missiles are 
not fueled and the warheads are not mated).226  Since China perceives its Second Artillery 
as the one service that gives Beijing its best “bang for the buck” (in terms of regional and 
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international influence), these strategic missile deficiencies will be overcome in the long 
term as China shifts from a doctrine of minimum deterrence to limited deterrence.   
China’s overall nuclear force modernization is focused on improving its nuclear 
deterrence by increasing the number of warheads that can target the United States.227  
While China has no more than twenty warheads capable of striking the American 
mainland, it is modernizing its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and road mobile ballistic missiles.228  While this 
number is relatively small, compared to the massive arsenals of the United States and 
Russia, these ICBMs can reach a number of strategic targets within India. 
With the emphasis on engineering, not to mention the espionage encouraged to 
obtain foreign missile technology, China will gradually improve the accuracy and range of 
its strategic nuclear forces by applying pressure on India to possibly develop and deploy 
some form of missile defense system.  This classic security dilemma will further stress 
Sino-Indian relations in the future and further endanger the fragile security situation in 
South Asia as India continues to bicker with its main nuclear rival, Pakistan.  China’s 
ambitious nuclear modernization efforts reflect its desire for foreign policy to minimize 
not only American, but Indian influence in Asia and strengthen China’s international 
power and prestige. 
3. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
In January 2003, India finally announced its Nuclear Doctrine and the 
establishment of a Strategic Forces Command aimed at removing any existing 
ambivalence surrounding India’s nuclear policy.229  With the formation of this Strategic 
Forces Command, India began to move from a passive nuclear doctrine that focused 
exclusively on defensive issues to a more flexible nuclear position dedicated to building 
and maintaining a credible minimal deterrent.230  While no mention was made of 
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conventional capability or nuclear triad, it has been assessed that India’s primary means of 
nuclear delivery will be from the air until its ballistic missile capability has matured.   
4. India’s Nuclear Capabilities Versus China 
India’s nuclear tests in May of 1998 were conducted to assure its citizens that 
nuclear weapons would protect and promote national security.231  In addition, the party in 
power at that time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), argued that India conducted the 
nuclear tests because China represented a long-term threat to Indian security.232  
Presently, India has few options for nuclear weapons delivery.  Due to the poor 
performance of its land-based ballistic missile systems, the Prithvi and the Agni, India has 
had to increasingly rely upon its aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons.  
Since India perceives China as its long-term security threat, the employment 
India’s sophisticated combat aircraft in a nuclear role demonstrates India’s strategic intent 
to deter and match China.233  In reality, it is highly unlikely that India could successfully 
deliver a nuclear weapon on any significant target in China since these nuclear-capable 
aircraft (Jaguar, Mirage 2000, Mig-27, and Su-30MKI) would have to cover such a large 
distance at low levels in order to avoid China’s sophisticated Integrated Air Defense 
System (IADS).234  For example, if the IAF’s most advanced and sophisticated combat 
aircraft, the Su-30MKI, was forward deployed along the border with China to execute a 
nuclear mission it would only get 1500km into China, which is well short of the 2500km 
needed to reach high value targets in Beijing (reference graph below). Thus, it will be 
extremely difficult for the Su-30MKI, or any other IAF nuclear-capable aircraft, to deliver 
a nuclear weapon inside China due to the lack of strategic targets within the aircraft’s 
combat radius, the strength of the Chinese IADS, and the caution of the IAF leadership to 
commit a high valued asset on an extremely risky mission.235   
                                                
231 13 May 1998 letter from Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to U.S. President Clinton.  “NUCLEAR 




234 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 552. 
235 Ibid, 543.  Ashley Tellis takes a different viewpoint by arguing that the Mirage 2000-H would be 
the best platform for a nuclear delivery mission because of the aircraft’s combat radius, avionics, defensive 
weaponry, and countermeasure systems.    
79 
 
Figure 11.   India’s Strategic Nuclear Reach from Tezpur.236 
 
5. China’s Nuclear Capabilities Far Surpass Those of India’s 
While New Delhi will continue to improve its nuclear weapons capability, it will 
be unable to match China’s nuclear weapons arsenal.  India does not have the specific 
technology and government support to develop the vast numbers of Short-Range Ballistic 
Missiles (SRBM) and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) that is already a part 
of the inventory of the Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces.  India is far more likely to strike 
China with its nuclear capable combat aircraft instead of its short-range and inconsistent 
Prithvi and Agni systems.  The chances of a successful Indian nuclear attack on strategic 
Chinese targets from the air are extremely unlikely due to the limitations on the aircraft 
combat radius and the significant air defenses of the PLA.  Furthermore, China is pursuing 
a nuclear triad as a means to deter other potential threats (such as the United States and 
Taiwan).  Thus, if China was ever forced into any nuclear war with India, it could easily 
defeat India since it has a larger nuclear weapons arsenal that can hit practically any 
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strategic Indian target.  India argued that it needed nuclear weapons to defend itself from 
China but in reality, India’s nuclear weapons are incapable of defeating China in any 
nuclear scenario. 
D. COMPARING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE TO 
THE INDIAN AIR FORCE  
The PLAAF is in the process of modernizing its aging combat aircraft and 
pursuing advanced weapon systems that will allow them to fight local wars under hi-tech 
conditions237  While the PLAAF inventory greatly outnumbers that of the IAF, the IAF is 
also acquiring and integrating sophisticated weapon systems to close the gap on the 
PLAAF.  In terms of actual flying capabilities, the IAF pilots are more capable than 
PLAAF pilots since they receive more flying hours and are better trained in tactics, 
techniques and procedures thanks to advanced training with foreign aviation forces.  The 
following sections will compare the PLAAF with the IAF and demonstrate why the 
PLAAF is currently incapable of defeating the IAF in any conventional conflict. 
1. PLAAF Doctrine and Strategy 
While the PLAAF has not publicly released its official doctrine, we have a decent 
ideal of their doctrine through the public statements of its leaders and the limited articles 
released from various offices within the PLA and PLAAF.  For example, the former head 
of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), Jiang Zemin, stated in 1999 that, “The 
Air Force must step up the ability to attack in the air and develop the equipment to do so.  
We must gradually move from air defense of our national territory to an Air Force with 
both attacking and defensive capabilities.”238   In order to promote the PLA’s overall goal 
of conducting “local, limited war under hi-tech conditions,” the PLAAF’s doctrine is 
beginning to move from the traditional defense of the homeland to a force capable of 
conducting quick and decisive offensive operations.  While the PLAAF’s official doctrine 
remains ambiguous, we can ascertain that its doctrine will still support the PLA by 
conducting air campaigns based on an “active initiative,” which means to turn a passive 
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posture into an active posture and to turn defense into offense.239  After the stunning 
success of U.S. airpower during the first Gulf War, the Chinese leadership realized that it 
had to quickly modernize the PLAAF because a nation cannot plan to fight a hi-tech war 
without having an effective air arm.240 
2. PLAAF Conventional Capabilities 
Without the massive Soviet aid and advisors (strongly represented in the 1950s) 
China has been unable to modernize its air force on its own.  As the PLAAF fleet grew 
during the 1980s, the growth was one of quantity, not quality, as the PLAAF was filled 
with obsolete aircraft and weapons systems; by 1988 half of the PLAAF aircraft were 
operational.241  While these limitations impeded the PLAAF’s combat readiness, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union permitted China to import vast amounts of cheap Russian 
aircraft and training from the 1990s until present day.  By specifically acquiring 
sophisticated combat fighters, such as the Su-27 and Su-30, the PLAAF is modernizing 
according to Beijing’s security and foreign policy goals.  While training deficiencies still 
remain, for example, the PLAAF does not train over water, it is making the right 
acquisitions in the realm of foreign arms sales.  Due to the lack of fourth generation 
fighters, the PLAAF is no match for U.S. air power; however, China is making moderate 
progress in competing with India by pursuing aerial refueling capabilities, improved ISR, 
and adequate airborne early warning platforms.242 
The PLAAF’s modernization efforts are based according to the criteria of “new, 
quality, modify, and introduce.”243  The focus of modernization in the PLAAF is focused 
on upgrading the entire inventory of combat and support aircraft, especially tactical 
fighter/bomber and air defense aircraft; in addition, the PLAAF is reequipping combat 
aircraft with new missile strike systems and electronic command and control systems for 
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the aircraft and aerial weaponry.244  Furthermore, the PLAAF is attempting to streamline 
its inventory whereby its massive numbers should be cut in half to approximately 2000 jet 
aircraft by 2005.245  In the following sections, I will highlight some of the major weapon 
systems in the PLAAF inventory and assess their advantages and disadvantages in any 
conventional conflict versus India. 
With respect to its goal of acquiring hi-tech multi-role fighters, China placed 
orders with Russia in recent years for the delivery of 75 to 80 Su-27Sk and Su-30MKK 
fighters; furthermore, China procured the license for the launch of its own production, 
with Russian technical assistance of 150 to 200 Sukhoi fighters in about 10 years.246 In 
terms of indigenous production, the Chinese are pursuing the development of the J-10 to 
help it obtain a fourth generation fighter with stealth technology.  By acquiring these 
advanced combat aircrafts, the PLAAF may not only dominate the skies in any 
conventional conflict against Taiwan but also challenge the advanced combat aircraft of 
the IAF (especially after its acquisition of the Su-30MKI).  On the other hand, China is 
over-reliant on ground control intercept and its pilots are less capable than those in the 
IAF due primarily to lack of funding to pay for flight hours and a lack of spare parts for 
aging Soviet era aircraft.  In addition, the PLAAF is not equipped to conduct night-flying 
operations.247  If the PLAAF fighters were to fly against the IAF fighters in any 
conventional conflict, especially in a border-war scenario, the IAF would hold the tactical 
advantage. 
For the time being, the PLAAF will have to seriously upgrade its ISR, aerial 
refueling, and even precision ground attack capability if it hopes to regain some form of 
parity with the IAF.  While the PLAAF is attempting to create a credible Airborne Early 
Warning and Control System (AWACS), it settled for the second best system in the arms 
market, the Russian A-50 Mainstay because the United States prevented the Chinese from 
purchasing the Phalcon AWACS from Israel.  Conversely, the IAF will receive three of 
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the Phalcon AWACS and have the ability to integrate its advanced fighters, heavy lift 
aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and aerial refuelers in any air campaign against China.  
The IAF has more advanced UAV programs in progress than China does therefore, 
in any conventional conflict intelligence will play a crucial role.  Due to its dominance in 
acquiring and integrating hi-tech combat aircraft, AWACS, aerial refuelers, and UAVs, 
plus its robust training program, the IAF could decidedly defeat the slowly modernizing 
PLAAF in any conventional air campaign, specifically any Himalayan border-type 
scenario.   
3. IAF Doctrine and Strategy 
The IAF was the first service in India to publish its own doctrine in 1996.  Since its 
independence in 1947, the Indian Army has dominated the budget and has driven the 
agenda of the Indian military.  With the lessons learned from the successful air campaigns 
in the first Gulf War and in Kosovo, high-ranking Indian military officials realized the 
importance of airpower and decided to make the modernization of the air force one of its 
top priorities.  Recently, the IAF has transitioned into a force dedicated exclusively to 
defense of Indian territory to one capable of accomplishing a variety of missions (close air 
support, deep strike operations, etc).    
4. IAF Conventional Capabilities 
The IAF is wisely upgrading, acquiring and integrating a variety of weapon 
systems in its effort to create a global air force.  The IAF successfully closed the 
conventional gap with the PLAAF by concentrating on quality rather than quantity.  The 
acquisition and integration of the Su-30MKI, Phalcon Airborne Early Warning System 
and Il-78 mid-air refueler described in Chapter II act as a force multiplier in any 
conventional conflict.  For the purposes of comparison with the PLAAF, I will briefly 
analyze these weapon systems and explain why the IAF can defeat the PLAAF in any 
conventional conflict.   
The Su-30MKI increases the ability of the IAF to defeat the PLAAF’s combat 
aircraft and gain air superiority in any border conflict with China.  The PLAAF, with over 
2,000 combat aircraft has an enormous quantitative advantage over India in a conventional 
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sense.248  Conversely, in comparison with India, China has been extremely slow in 
modernizing its air force, mainly due to corruption and inadequacies in its military 
industrial complex.  With the Su-30MKI, the IAF has made a modest effort to catch up 
with the PLAAF in terms of quality.  In any case, The PLAAF realizes that the IAF is 
significantly modernizing its combat aircraft capability and are acquiring highly capable 
Su-27 and Su-30MKs.  The modernization efforts of both air forces represent not only the 
desire to defend their respective territories, but to project force as an emerging regional 
power.  Depending on how long it will take the PLAAF to modernize (estimates range 
from 10 to 20 more years), the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft (led by the Su-30MKI) is 
presently capable of defending Indian territory from a Chinese air attack.  
India’s acquisition of the Phalcon AWACS gives it a tactical advantage versus 
China.  For instance, since the Phalcon system can pick out enemy aircraft flying hundreds 
of miles away in all weather, day or night, or even those flying at low altitude, it could 
counter any conventional PLAAF threat in the North or Northeast of India well in 
advance.249  This advanced warning is vital in any conventional confrontation with China 
since India is still modernizing its air defense and interceptor aircraft (already moving in 
the right direction with the Su-30MKI) that will take some time to develop.  The Phalcon 
AWACS closes the qualitative conventional gap with China and giving India the early 
warning it needs to properly defend itself from any “nasty surprises” along the Himalayas 
in order to avert any future wars with timely and diplomatic action.250  Although it will 
take some time to integrate the Su-30MKI with the Phalcon AWACS, India must 
accomplish this task if it hopes to move towards network centric warfare and keep China 
somewhat off balance.  With India and China’s history of conventional conflict, and 
mutual  suspicions,  it  will   be   relatively   easy  for  both  countries  to  misconstrue  one  
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another’s motives.251  Thus, the IAF also acquired the Phalcon AWACS to substantially 
upgrade its early warning capability to meet any contingency with the PLAAF in the 
Himalayas.252   
The Il-78 air-to-air refueler also increases the IAF’s combat capability versus 
PLAAF.  According to an anonymous IAF officer, “With such air-to-air refuelers, we will 
be able to fly our air superiority fighters like the Su-30MKIs for over 10 hours at a stretch 
without landing.  Similarly, longer air defense missions will also be possible.  It will 
enhance our capabilities against China.”253  China is still in the process of diversifying its 
air force (in the past, 70 percent of the PLAAF consisted of combat fighters); therefore, 
the PLAAF is pursuing its own mid-air refueler to project power along its borders.254  At 
the present, one regiment of about 10 H-6U tankers, converted from H-6 bombers, support 
a regiment of J-8D fighters as China is looking to procure Il-78M tankers from Russia.255  
For the time being, the IAF maintains a competitive advantage over the PLAAF’s mid-air 
capabilities in terms of quality since the IAF Il-78s have already begun to conduct air-to-
air refueling with the IAF’s advanced Su-30MKI.   
5. India Capable of “Winning the Skies” Versus China 
With the successful deployment of the IAF Il-78 mid air refueler to Alaska in 
support of exercise COPE THUNDER, held this past June with the USAF and other air 
forces, the IAF demonstrated its capability to project power outside its borders while the 
PLAAF is still unable to achieve this capability.  Furthermore, the IAF has done a better 
job of integrating all of its air assets and achieving a more sophisticated level of C4I than 
the PLAAF.  The IAF is definitely further along the PLAAF in its goal of creating a global 
air force due to the acquisitions it has made, the high level proficiency of its pilots and 
ability to gain invaluable flying experience by exercising with other capable air forces.  
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Therefore, China would be unable to sustain any conventional air victories due to India’s 
strong and modern air force that continues to improve on strategic lift, precision strike, 
and ISR.   
E. CONCLUSION 
As a rational actor in a chaotic world, China will defend its security interests at all 
costs.  With the arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1998 and the growing 
economic and military strength of India, Chinese defense planners are clearly tracking the 
modernization of Indian nuclear weapons programs and the IAF.  This chapter reveals that 
the China can decisively defeat India in any nuclear confrontation, but is currently unable 
to match the IAF in any conventional conflict, specifically along the border region of the 
Himalayas.  This assessment revealed the weakness in PLAAF modernization compared 
to the modernization of the IAF due to funding constraints and the actual flying 
proficiencies of both air forces.  Furthermore, the IAF has greater experience than the 
PLAAF in actual combat operations with its many conflicts, even as recently as the 1999 
Kargil conflict, against Pakistan.  While China will maintain its nuclear advantage over 
India in the long term, India will continue to modernize its air arm in an effort to become 
Asia’s strongest air force and to better promote its regional strategic interests.   
It is vital for American intelligence analysts to analyze the development and 
modernization of the nuclear and air capabilities of both China and India because both 
nations are beginning to emerge as main powers throughout Asia, in conjunction with 
Japan. According to the Central Intelligence Agency Director, Peter Goss, “Beijing’s 
military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan 
Strait and threatens U.S. forces in the region.”256  While it is easy for intelligence analysts 
to focus on how China may seize Taiwan, a potential conflict between China and India 
cannot be neglected any longer.  This analysis of China’s military capabilities in 
comparison with the strongest air force in South Asia may assist American defense 
planners in developing a coherent military strategy with India that may help 
counterbalance China’s aggressive military build up.  
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The stunning examples of airpower in the two Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan proved to the Indian civilian and military leadership the value of airpower.257  
Thanks to the amazing growth of the Indian economy, the IAF is acquiring the weapon 
systems characteristic of a global aerospace force.  The description and analysis of the 
IAF’s robust modernization campaign highlights the IAF’s ability to conduct lethal 
operations while transforming itself from an air force dedicated to air defense to one 
capable of global force projection.  Pakistan and China are concerned about the 
motivations behind IAF’s modernization efforts and already have begun to improve their 
own air capabilities in response to any conventional or nuclear contingency.  The 
responses of Pakistan, in particular, indicate the lowering of the nuclear threshold in South 
Asia.  On the other front, a potential arms race between India and China is anticipated.   
The United States may be able to neutralize the damaging effects of India’s 
military build-up by increasing its arms exports to both India and Pakistan.  Specifically, 
the sale of American F-16s to both countries would fortify bilateral relation with the 
United States, maintain the fragile security balance in South Asia, and minimize China’s 
influence in the region.  This concluding chapter reviews the findings of this thesis and 
highlights certain implications of IAF modernization for U.S. policy makers and defense 
planners. 
B. FINDINGS 
The IAF began its program of modernization in the mid-1990s.  Since then, the 
IAF has made significant progress in acquiring and developing sophisticated aircraft 
weapon systems to obtain complete conventional air superiority with the PAF while 
closing the gap on conventional capabilities with the PLAAF.  The specific goals of 
“quick and lethal force” desired by the IAF leadership are easily identified by the IAF’s 
latest acquisitions, including the Sukhoi Su-30MKI advanced combat fighter, the Phalcon 
airborne early warning system, and the IL-78 air-to-air refueler.258  While the IAF’s 
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acquisition and integration of these three platforms will act as force multipliers in any 
conventional contingency, they have limited utility in a nuclear role (except for the Su-
30MKI).  Furthermore, the modernization of the IAF is not exclusively focused on these 
three platforms also is devoted to upgrading the IAF’s multi-role fighters, UAVs, and air 
defense system in order to maintain air superiority in South Asia while projecting air 
power beyond India’s traditional periphery. 
Pakistan remains economically and politically constrained and will be unable to 
considerably upgrade its air force’s conventional capabilities in the immediate future 
without significant foreign assistance.  The United States has provided Pakistan with 
military equipment and training to fight terrorism (C-130s, Bell helicopters and 
surveillance radars) and is considering the sale of additional F-16s to its newly designated 
“major non-NATO ally.”259  The United States has the unique opportunity to limit the 
amount of Sino-Pakistani military cooperation in the future by providing Pakistan with F-
16s.  If the United States provides Pakistan with F-16s, Washington needs to consider 
providing India with a sophisticated multi-role fighter, such as the F-16, so as not to 
endanger the emerging Indo-American strategic partnership.  The likelihood of U.S. 
military equipment to India has increased recently as India announced that it was planning 
a large purchase of sophisticated fighter jets presenting U.S. policymakers with a rare 
chance to maintain a perceived evenhandedness in arms sales to South Asia’s two 
strongest militaries.260 
China does not perceive the IAF modernization campaign as a significant threat. 
China is indifferent to IAF modernization since China perceives the United States, not 
India, as its primary opponent in the region.  Furthermore, China is more concerned with 
reclaiming Taiwan so the structure of its air force is more concentrated on its coastal 
region than with its southern border along the Himalayas.  Regardless, China will continue 
to provide Pakistan with arms to help it counter Indian conventional military superiority in 
South Asia, so as to keep India focused on Pakistan, and not China, which otherwise 
would be the focus of Indian national security concerns. 
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The modernization of the IAF enhances India’s war-fighting capabilities but 
threatens Pakistan, which will further strengthen its nuclear and ballistic missile capability 
while pressuring the United States to provide it with additional F-16s.  The wheels of 
modernization in the PLAAF have finally begun to pick up speed as China fortifies its 
military in order to deter Taiwanese independence but to also project power to defend its 
energy interests abroad.  Without a serious American commitment to sell Pakistan F-16s, 
it is inevitable that the modernization of the IAF will further increase military ties between 
Pakistan and China.  Furthermore, the strength of the Sino-Pakistani relationship depends 
heavily on the pace of IAF modernization.  The sooner that the IAF is capable of 
integrating ISR, air-to-air refuelers, multi-role fighters, and credible transport aircraft into 
a true global aerospace force capable of network-centric warfare, the sooner Pakistan and 
China will increase conventional arms transfers, specifically ground/airborne early 
warning radars, mutli-role fighters, and UAVs 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Of particular concern for U.S. policymakers and defense planners is how the IAF’s 
successful modernization may embolden India to conduct quick, offensive air operations 
against Pakistan over the contested Kashmir region, lowering the nuclear threshold in 
South Asia.  Thus, it is in the best interest of the United States to manage a potentially 
destabilizing security threat in the region by providing Pakistan with the technology 
necessary to improve its weak conventional airpower so that Pakistan will not 
immediately resort to nuclear weapons.  The sale of F-16s to Pakistan would not only re-
affirm Washington’s commitment to Pakistan as a “major non-NATO ally” dedicated to 
the War on Terrorism but dilute Beijing’s influence over Islamabad.  Another 
recommendation is to provide Pakistan with sophisticated airborne early warning 
capability, enhancing Pakistan’s ISR capabilities to the point where India and Pakistan 
have the “eyes and ears” to monitor each other and not resort to the nuclear option due to 
poor intelligence.261  In addition to security assistance, the United States should continue 
this strategic partnership in the War on Terror by providing Pakistan with the funding 
necessary to revive its economy while establishing credible educational and democratic 
institutions.   
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In respect to India, the United States should continue bilateral and multilateral 
military exercises tailored to promote India’s emergence as a regional military force 
capable of countering a militarily strong China. With the successes in the Joint Indo-
American and multi-national air exercises, Cope India and Cope Thunder, the IAF now 
perceives itself as a world-class air force262  U.S. defense planners need to understand that 
India is content to increase training with other air forces since this supports its foreign 
policy of multilateralism.  Since the United States has historically been an inconsistent 
geo-political partner, America’s military to military cooperation with India will not 
improve unless Washington is willing to sell India advanced technology.  If the United 
States is unable to fulfill the IAF’s requirement of a multi-role fighter, then the IAF will 
keep its options open and increase training and arms purchases with other competitive air 
forces.  For example, security cooperation between India and Israel is likely to grow more 
quickly than U.S.-Indian military cooperation if Washington does not start providing India 
with significant military sales opportunities.  
The United States is just beginning to formulate a security assistance program with 
India and should take note of the modernization efforts listed in this thesis and tailor its 
military assistance accordingly.   I not only recommend the sale of F-16s to India to fulfill 
its multi-role fighter requirement, but also recommend improving India’s poor medium-lift 
transport capability.263  Also, if the United States wants to pursue its Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) initiative in Asia, it will need to focus on the pros and cons of selling India 
the PAC-III missile defense system.  Islamabad’s greatest fear of Indo-American missile 
defense cooperation is that Indian political-military behavior will become more pugnacious 
under a BMD umbrella encouraging Indian pre-emptive air strikes into Pakistan.264   
Pakistan may respond to an Indian BMD capability by increasing its SRBM and MRBM 
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production in order to protect its aircraft in the event of an Indian air attack.265  I argue that 
the United States should not pursue a BMD capability in South Asia since this will 
severely threaten the fragile security balance in the region.  Instead, the United States can 
foster stability in the region by encouraging the non-deployment of nuclear weapons and 
bolstering the conventional capabilities of both countries to the point where they deter the 
other.266 
It would be naïve to not take into consideration the influence of the American 
military industrial complex when developing recommendations for arms sales to either 
Pakistan or India.  Lockheed Martin has been pushing Washington on the dual sale of F-
16s to Pakistan and India because unless orders are received by October 2005 it will have 
to begin shutting down its production line late this year.267  Since it takes three years to 
build an F-16, some work would continue at the facility through 2008.268  Furthermore, 
American defense companies are eager to enter the Indian defense industry in order to 
access cheap Indian labor and possibly increase sales to India’s growing military (a role 
traditionally fulfilled by Russia).  In fact, the tentative F-16 plan calls for the United States 
to sell Pakistan two dozen F-16s (built at Lockheed’s Texas plant) while the Indians could 
buy as many as 125 F-16s with the first dozen jets built in the United States then 
production shifting to India.269   
While it is extremely important for Washington to re-evaluate potential arms sales 
to South Asia, it is also important for U.S. policymakers to realize the rapid technological 
advances taking place in the IAF.  Specifically, the rapid, technological development of the 
IAF explained here are designed for the U.S. Congress to take note of a militarily strong 
India and reconsider its proposed funding cuts for the United States Air Force’s most 
                                                
265 Feroz Khan (Brigadier General (Ret.), Pakistan Army), discussion with author, 24 March 2005. 
266 Ibid 
267 Robbins, Jaffe, and Karp, “U.S. May Sell F-16s to India, Pakistan.” 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid.  The F-16’s fuselage, containing the aircraft’s most sensitive electronics equipment, would 
continue to be made in the United States, according to a U.S. defense-industry official. 
92 
advanced combat fighter of the future, the F/A-22 Raptor. 270   The United States has 
always been at the forefront of aviation innovation, but continued to cuts to the Air Force’s 
next generation fighter may have catastrophic repercussions for America’s national 
security in any large-scale conventional or nuclear war that may present itself.  
Pakistan and China are very concerned about IAF modernization, yet there have 
been no major wars in the subcontinent since India began modernizing its military in the 
late 1990s.  Instead of assuming that the IAF’s modernization will further destabilize the 
region, I argue that the United States now has a unique opportunity to mange the security 
situation in the subcontinent.  With the careful and deliberate sale of F-16s to both India 
and Pakistan, Washington can limit Sino-Pakistani military cooperation, strengthen the 
strategic bilateral relationship with both countries, and maintain an “airpower imbalance 
status quo” in South Asia whereby Pakistan does not immediately resort to nuclear 
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